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TEXTUALISM AND STATUTORY PRECEDENTS
Anita S. Krishnakumar
This Article seeks to shed light on a little-noticed trend in recent U.S.
Supreme Court statutory interpretation cases: the Court’s textualist
Justices—or at least some subset of them—have proved remarkably
willing to abandon stare decisis and to argue in favor of overruling
established statutory interpretation precedents. This is especially
curious given that statutory precedents are supposed to be sacrosanct.
Congress, rather than the Court, is the preferred vehicle for
correcting any errors in the judicial construction of a statute, and
courts are to overrule such constructions only in rare, compelling
circumstances. What, then, accounts for the textualist Justices’
unabashed willingness to overrule statutory precedents in recent
years? And how can this practice be reconciled with textualism’s core
aims of promoting clarity and stability in the law?
This Article advances a threefold thesis. First, it argues that the
textualist Justices view precedents that create a test for implementing
a statute (e.g., the “motivating factor” test for Title VII violations) as
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different from ordinary text-parsing statutory interpretation (e.g.,
“labor” means “manual labor”). More specifically, textualist jurists
regard what I call “implementation test” precedents as akin to
common-law decision-making, rather than statutory interpretation—
and seem to have created a de facto “implementation-test exception”
to the heightened stare decisis protection normally afforded statutory
precedents. Second, the Article links textualist Justices’ proclivity for
overruling to an oft-unspoken predicate assumption of textualism—
that is, that there is a singular “correct answer” to every question of
statutory interpretation. This assumption may make it especially
difficult for textualist jurists to accept the idea that an incorrect
statutory interpretation should be left in place simply because it was
first in time. Last, the Article notes that some textualist jurists see
themselves as “revolutionaries,” whose function is to overthrow the
old, corrupt jurisprudential order, including outmoded precedents
reached through the use of illegitimate, atextual interpretive
resources.
Ultimately, the Article both supports and critiques textualist Justices’
approach to statutory precedents. On the one hand, it argues that a
relaxed form of stare decisis for implementation test precedents makes
sense for many reasons, as long as special deference is given to
implementation tests that Congress has expressly endorsed. At the
same time, it rejects textualists’ attempts to overrule nonimplementation test precedents based on simple disagreement with the
original interpretation.
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INTRODUCTION
Statutory stare decisis—sometimes referred to as the “super-strong”1
presumption that prior judicial interpretations of a statute are correct and
should not be overruled except by congressional amendment—has been
the subject of significant normative debate among legal scholars. Some
have argued that the presumption should be absolute, freezing in place
judicial interpretations of statutes until and unless Congress acts,2 while
others have advocated a more relaxed rule that allows for judicial
overruling of statutory precedents that have grown outmoded.3 Several
studies—many of them recent—have tackled the related questions of
how often Congress overrides judicial interpretations of statutes and
how courts implement such overrides.4
1

I borrow this term from William Eskridge. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling
Statutory Precedents, 76 Geo. L.J. 1361, 1362 (1988).
2
See Lawrence C. Marshall, Contempt of Congress: A Reply to the Critics of an Absolute
Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 2467, 2467 (1990); Lawrence C. Marshall,
“Let Congress Do It”: The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 Mich. L.
Rev. 177, 182–83 (1989) [hereinafter Marshall, Let Congress Do It]; Adrian Vermeule,
Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 74, 143–45 (2000).
3
See Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1363–64; William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Case of the
Amorous Defendant: Criticizing Absolute Stare Decisis for Statutory Cases, 88 Mich. L.
Rev. 2450, 2452 (1990) [hereinafter Eskridge, Amorous Defendant].
4
See, e.g., Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides
of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 1317,
1318 (2014); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 101 Yale L.J. 331, 334 (1991); Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue? Political
Polarization, the Supreme Court, and Congress, 86 S. Cal. L. Rev. 205, 210 (2013); Virginia
A. Hettinger & Christopher Zorn, Explaining the Incidence and Timing of Congressional
Responses to the U.S. Supreme Court, 30 Legis. Stud. Q. 5, 6 (2005); Pablo T. Spiller &
Emerson H. Tiller, Invitations to Override: Congressional Reversals of Supreme Court
Decisions, 16 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 503, 504 (1996); Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow
Precedents and the Separation of Powers: Statutory Interpretation of Congressional
Overrides, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 511, 516–17 (2009) [hereinafter Widiss, Shadow
Precedents]; Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra
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Largely absent from the literature, however, has been any discussion
of the relationship between statutory interpretation theory and statutory
stare decisis.5 That is, do textualist and purposivist interpretive
philosophies differ in their theoretical views toward statutory stare
decisis? Are there any noticeable differences in how jurists who
associate themselves with different interpretive theories treat or talk
about statutory stare decisis? For all the attention that scholars have
devoted to methodological differences in statutory interpretation, no one
seems to have given much thought to differences in interpretive views
about statutory stare decisis. Meanwhile, scholarship in this area is
increasingly relevant because several recent U.S. Supreme Court
decisions reveal a surprising trend: the Court’s textualists—or at least
some subset of them—regularly are willing to overturn statutory
precedents. Indeed, they are far more willing to do so than are their
purposivist counterparts. This trend is noteworthy because it is the
opposite of what we would expect; on the whole, textualists tend to
prioritize the predictability and stability of legal rules and other “rule of
law” values over the flexibility associated with looser, case-by-case
decision-making.6 Purposivists, by contrast, tend to be more willing to
tolerate inconsistency and case-by-case adjudication. Yet, during the
Roberts Court’s first decade, the Court’s textualist or textualist-leaning
Justices repeatedly have called for overruling a statutory precedent, even
when doing so would upset settled expectations.7 By contrast, the
Court’s purposivist Justices have called for overruling a statutory
precedent only once during the same period.8
Problem in Statutory Interpretation, 90 Tex. L. Rev. 859, 865 (2012) [hereinafter Widiss,
Undermining Overrides].
5
But see Stephen M. Rich, A Matter of Perspective: Textualism, Stare Decisis, and
Federal Employment Discrimination Law, 87 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1197, 1202 (2014) (arguing
that textualist interpretive methodology has undermined several employment-law doctrines
without expressly overruling them, stare decisis notwithstanding).
6
See, e.g., Grant Gilmore, The Ages Of American Law 17 (1977) (maintaining that
formalism “holds out the promise of stability, certainty, and predictability”); Antonin Scalia
& Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts xxix (2012)
(“[T]extualism will provide greater certainty in the law, and hence greater predictability and
greater respect for the rule of law.”); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 571,
597–98 (1987) (noting that predictability is important in planning and litigation).
7
See infra Appendix I (listing twelve such cases in ten terms).
8
See id.
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Consider a few examples. In 2015, self-avowed textualist Justices
Alito, Thomas, and Roberts voted (in dissent) to overrule a 1964 Patent
Act precedent because the Court’s original interpretation was based on
an economic theory that has since been “debunked.”9 A few terms
earlier, Justices Thomas, Alito, and Scalia similarly argued (in a
concurrence) that a 1988 securities law precedent should be overruled
because it was based on a since-disproved theory of efficient markets.10
In a handful of other cases, Justice Thomas has issued solo dissents
arguing that a statutory precedent should be overruled, stare decisis
notwithstanding.11 While judges and commentators have articulated a
few exceptions to statutory stare decisis that the entire Court follows, the
textualist Justices’ calls to overrule in the above cases have not tended to
fit into such exceptions.12 Only one of the above cases, for example,
involved a so-called “common-law statute”—that is, a statute that is
considered a delegation of broad authority to courts and therefore
exempt from statutory stare decisis.13
The puzzle thus emerges: what accounts for textualist Justices’
dismissiveness towards statutory precedents in such cases? One obvious

9

Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2415 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting).
Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2417–27 (2014) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgement).
11
See, e.g., Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 363 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting);
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 114–16 (2007) (Thomas, J., dissenting). For a
nonexhaustive list of Roberts and Rehnquist Court cases in which at least one Justice called
for overruling a statutory precedent, see infra Appendix I.
12
See discussion infra Part I. Previously articulated exceptions include those for (1)
procedural flaws—for example, when a precedent was the product of poor briefing or
inadequate deliberation by the Court; (2) common-law or constitutionalized statutes; and (3)
instances where Congress or private persons relied upon the precedent. See Eskridge, supra
note 1, at 1369–84.
13
The case was Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007).
Four other cases listed in Appendix I also involved the Sherman Act. For detailed discussion
of the common-law-statutes exception to statutory stare decisis, see, for example, Ethan J.
Leib & Michael Serota, The Costs of Consensus in Statutory Construction, 120 Yale L.J.
Online 47, 53 (2010) (“In the world of what are sometimes known as common law statutes,
broad delegation to the judiciary is uncontroversial, and the legislature expects judges to
develop the law over time by utilizing a free-form common law method.”); Margaret H.
Lemos, Interpretive Methodology and Delegations to Courts: Are “Common-Law Statutes”
Different?, in Intellectual Property and the Common Law 89, 91–93 (Shyamkrishna
Balganesh ed., 2013).
10
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answer is ideology—that is, that textualist Justices are less respectful of
statutory precedents that produce results that run counter to their
ideological preferences. But while ideology certainly seems to play some
role in some of the cases, it does not provide a complete explanation for
the Justices’ approaches in all the cases that advocate overruling a
statutory precedent.14 And although some of the cases may be explained
as simple instances of textualist jurists prioritizing a clear text over a
precedent they believe misreads that text, most cannot. In fact, many of
the cases in which textualist or textualist-leaning Justices have voted to
reject an established statutory precedent have not involved much textual
analysis at all.15 So something other than ideology and fidelity to text
must be at work in at least some of the cases.
This Article seeks to bring critical attention to textualist jurists’
demonstrated willingness to flout the doctrine of statutory stare
decisis—and to use this surprising trend as a lens through which to glean
important insights about statutory interpretation theory and textualism in
particular. Most statutory interpretation scholarship is top-down. It
conceives of theories of statutory interpretation in a highly abstract and
idealized fashion, debating the merits of textualism, purposivism, and
pragmatism in general terms and using particular cases merely as oneoff illustrations or to score debating points.16 In the statutory stare
14

See discussion infra notes 115–120 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2415 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting);
Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2418 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgement); Michigan v. Bay
Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2045 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that
although he initially joined in the interpretation at issue, time has proved that decision wrong
and “[r]ather than insist that Congress clean up a mess that [he] helped make, [he] would
overrule [the precedent]”); id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that precedent interpretation
that extended tribal sovereign immunity to suits arising out of an Indian tribe’s commercial
activities outside its territory was unsupported by the underlying rationale for tribal
immunity, inconsistent with limits on tribal sovereignty, and interfered with state
sovereignty and that the passage of time has proved it a bad interpretation); Leegin, 551 U.S.
at 882; State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 15 (1997) (overruling precedent based on
subsequent developments in legal doctrine and evolving economic theories about vertical
price restraints); Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 207–08 (1991) (O’Connor
& Scalia, JJ., dissenting).
16
See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1479-81 (1987); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory
Interpretation, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 671 (1999); John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists
From Purposivists?, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 70, 70 (2006); Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?,
15
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decisis context, this conventional, theory-driven approach has caused
scholars to miss the fact that textualist and purposivist Justices have
starkly different views about several issues that make a great deal of
practical difference in how courts interpret statutes. For example,
textualists and purposivists diverge in their views about the “stickiness”
of precedents that establish tests for implementing a statute, about the
role of the U.S. Supreme Court in supervising how such implementation
tests fare in the lower courts, and about how judges should treat
legislative overrides of the Court’s interpretations.17
This Article deviates from the conventional top-down approach.
Instead, it begins from the bottom-up, examining patterns in cases
involving statutory stare decisis to discover what they reveal about
statutory interpretation theory. The Article proceeds in three Parts.
Part I catalogues several recent cases in which textualist or textualistleaning Justices18 have voted to overrule an established statutory
91 Va. L. Rev. 347 (2005); Vermeule, supra note 2. Thanks to Mila Sohoni for pointing this
out.
17
See discussion infra Parts II.A & II.B.
18
For purposes of this Article, I count as “textualists” Justices Scalia and Thomas and as
“textualist-leaning” Justices Alito, Roberts, and Kennedy. Justices Scalia and Thomas
regularly identify themselves as textualists and clearly follow a textualist interpretive
methodology—seeking to identify the plain meaning of statutory text, informed by
dictionary definitions, language canons, and the whole-act rule while eschewing reliance on
legislative history, intent, and purpose. Justices Alito, Roberts, and Kennedy, although less
purist in their use of textualist interpretive tools, also emphasize these tools when construing
statutes. See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev.
825, 849 (2017); Peter J. Smith, Textualism and Jurisdiction, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1883, 1887
(2008) (“[I]t appears that several Justices—clearly Justices Scalia and Thomas, and perhaps
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Kennedy—on the Supreme Court now consider
themselves textualists.”). This labeling is consistent with how other scholars and
commentators have depicted these Justices. See Ernest Gellhorn, Justice Breyer on Statutory
Review and Interpretation, 8 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 755, 758 (1995) (“Justices Kennedy and
Scalia have led a ‘textualist’ movement claiming that the ‘plain meaning’ of the statute
should be given effect.”); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101
Colum. L. Rev. 1, 125 & n.505 (2001) (calling Justice Kennedy a textualist “fellow
traveler[]”); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Justice Breyer: Intentionalist, Pragmatist, and Empiricist,
8 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 747, 748 n.5 (1995) (listing Justice Kennedy as a textualist); John F.
Duffy, In re Nuitjen: Patentable Subject Matter, Textualism and the Supreme Court,
Patently-O (Feb. 5, 2007), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2007/02/in_re_nuijten_p.html
(observing that Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito
“adhere to some form of fairly rigorous textualism in statutory interpretation”). I have not
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precedent. Part II advances three theories and lessons about textualism
that emerge from close examination of textualist Justices’ willingness to
depart from statutory stare decisis in those cases. First, textualist Justices
are especially willing to overturn statutory precedents that establish a
decision-making rule designed to guide the implementation of the statute
in future cases, as opposed to precedents that closely parse the meaning
of statutory text. For example, they consider a precedent that establishes
a burden-shifting test for Title VII lawsuits as less authoritative than a
precedent that construes the word “labor” to refer only to “manual” but
not “intellectual” labor. The explanation for this appears to be that
textualist Justices view precedents that articulate an implementation test
as more akin to judge-made common law rules than traditional statutory
construction. Accordingly, they consider it the Court’s, rather than
Congress’s, responsibility to correct errors in such tests. Second, Part II
argues that textualist Justices, particularly in the post-Scalia era,19 seem
prone to a “correct answer” mindset—and that this jurisprudential
commitment to precision and a single correct statutory meaning may
make it particularly difficult for textualist Justices to sacrifice accuracy
in favor of stability. In addition, and perhaps relatedly, some textualist
jurists see themselves as revolutionaries, whose purpose and function is
to overthrow the old, corrupt judicial order, including improperly
reasoned statutory precedents.
counted Justice Gorsuch as a “textualist” or “textualist-leaning” Justice because as this
article goes to press, he has been on the U.S. Supreme Court for only a few months and has
participated in only a few cases. While one commentator has labeled Justice Gorsuch a
“textualist,” see Ramesh Ponnuru, Neil Gorsuch: A Worthy Heir to Scalia, Nat’l Rev. (Jan.
31, 2017), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/444437/neil-gorsuch-antonin-scaliastextualist-originalist-heir), scholars have not yet studied his opinions or approach in statutory
cases systematically. Without the benefit of such systematic analysis, it would be premature
to characterize him as either “textualist” or “textualist-leaning,” and it would be especially
premature to opine about his approach to statutory stare decisis.
19
Justice Scalia is widely considered to have ushered in a radical new form of statutory
interpretation in the 1990s—the “New Textualism,” which broke from the old, soft plainmeaning rule and traditional textualism in its absolutist rejection of all forms of legislative
history and its emphasis on ordinary usage and consistency with the “corpus juris” (the
surrounding body of law) as the lodestars of statutory interpretation. See William N.
Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 621, 623–24 (1990); Antonin
Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A Matter of Interpretation: Federal
Courts and the Law 3, 17 (Amy Gutman ed., 1997).
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Part III considers the normative implications of the theories advanced
in Part II. It argues that while certain elements of textualists’ approach to
statutory precedents may properly be retained, others deserve to be
jettisoned. When courts create tests for implementing a statute, they are
engaging in a gap-filling enterprise similar to that which administrative
agencies perform and courts, like agencies, should have the power to
update or revise these tests to reflect practical difficulties experienced in
administering them. But this principle is subject to an important limit:
relaxed stare decisis for statutory precedents is appropriate only in the
limited context of precedents that establish an implementation test and
does not justify overruling precedents with which later courts simply
disagree.
I. RECENT TEXTUALIST DEPARTURES FROM STATUTORY STARE DECISIS
Before delving into the cases, it is worth providing a little
background. Statutory precedents are supposed to enjoy a special status
in the law. Whereas common-law precedents are entitled to an ordinary
“presumption of correctness” and constitutional precedents receive a
relaxed presumption of correctness—because the complexity of
amending the Constitution makes judicial correction the only effective
avenue for fixing errors in constitutional interpretation—statutory
precedents are treated to a “super-strong” presumption of correctness.20
Indeed, the Court has said that it will overrule statutory precedents only
under the most compelling circumstances, and Justice Brandeis
famously commented that “in most matters it is more important that the
applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right. . . . This is
commonly true even where the error is a matter of serious concern,
provided correction can be had by legislation.”21 Numerous judges and
commentators have noted that the Court’s heightened fidelity to stare
decisis in the statutory context “marks an essential difference between

20

Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1362; see also Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas, 285 U.S. 393,
406–07 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
21
Burnet, 285 U.S. at 406 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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statutory interpretation on the one hand and [common] law and
constitutional interpretation on the other.”22
Scholars have both applauded and criticized this heightened
presumption of correctness. Professor Frank Horack, for example,
argued that the presumption is a necessary corollary to the separation of
powers. He reasoned that once the Court has interpreted a statute, the
statute becomes “amended to the extent of the Court’s decision” so that
“[a]fter the decision, whether the Court correctly or incorrectly
interpreted the statute, the law consists of the statute plus the decision of
the Court.”23 If the Court later reverses the position it took in the first
case, it is “affirmatively changing an established rule of law under which
society has been operating”—something that is “explicitly and
unquestionably the exercise of a legislative function.”24
Professor Lawrence Marshall has advocated going one step further,
urging the Court to adopt an absolute rule of stare decisis for all its
statutory decisions.25 Marshall reasons that as an elected branch,
Congress, rather than the Court, must be an “active participant in the
ongoing process of statutory lawmaking” and that the only way to
ensure that this will happen is to “let Congress know that it, and only it,
is responsible for reviewing the Court’s statutory decisions, and that it,
and only it, has the power to overrule the Court’s interpretations of

22

Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, 476 U.S 409, 424 n.34 (1986) (quoting
Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. Chi. L. Rev. 501, 540 (1948)).
See also Frank E. Horack, Jr., Congressional Silence: A Tool of Judicial Supremacy, 25 Tex.
L. Rev. 247, 248–49 (1947) (defending the super-strong presumption against overruling
statutory precedents); Robert E. Keeton, Venturing to Do Justice: Reforming Private Law
79–80 (1969) (citing Levi’s arguments in favor of stricter stare decisis because controversial
changes are better enacted by the legislature); Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C.
L. Rev. 367, 388–89 (1988) (criticizing the Court’s disparate treatment of statutory versus
common law or constitutional precedents); C. Paul Rogers III, Judicial Reinterpretation of
Statutes: The Example of Baseball and the Antitrust Laws, 14 Houston L. Rev. 611, 611, 626
(1977) (noting that the “prevailing view” is that stare decisis should be followed more
strictly for statutory precedents than for “common law or [other] court-made precedents”);
James C. Rehnquist, Note, The Power That Shall Be Vested in a Precedent: Stare Decisis,
the Constitution and the Supreme Court, 66 B.U. L. Rev. 345, 370 (1986) (defending the
presumption in statutory but not constitutional cases).
23
Horack, supra note 22, at 250–51 (emphasis in original).
24
Id. at 251.
25
See Marshall, Let Congress Do It, supra note 2, at 183.
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federal statutes.”26 Professor Adrian Vermeule has seconded the call for
an absolute rule of statutory stare decisis, based on traditional textualist
concerns about administrative efficiency.27
By contrast, Professor Bill Eskridge and other pragmatist legal
process scholars have urged judges to take a more relaxed approach to
statutory stare decisis—one that allows for overruling precedents that
have grown outmoded over time.28 For example, Eskridge argues that
the heightened presumption in favor of upholding statutory precedents
should give way when changed circumstances render a precedent
inconsistent with original legislative expectations or evolving statutory
policy, or when practical experience suggests that a precedent is no
longer working.29
In regularly calling for overruling statutory precedents, the textualist
and textualist-leaning Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court have thus
taken an approach that—oddly—is more in line with the one advocated
by their philosophical adversary, Bill Eskridge, than by their intellectual
ally Adrian Vermeule. Again, this is the opposite of what we would
expect based on theory alone, as textualism prioritizes predictability and
stability in the law.30
This Part examines several cases in which textualist or textualistleaning Justices on the Roberts and Rehnquist Courts voted to overrule a
statutory precedent. Section A discusses cases in which textualist
Justices advocated rejecting a statutory precedent because the precedent
was based on a since-discredited economic theory. Section B examines
cases in which textualist Justices refused to apply a precedent
interpreting one statute to a closely related statute that was modeled on
or contained the exact same language as the statute interpreted in the
precedent case. Section C explores cases in which textualist Justices
26

Id.
See Vermeule, supra note 2, at 143–45 (“The stronger the rule of statutory stare decisis,
the less frequently litigants will request an overruling and the less time that must be spent on
reconsidering previously decided questions.”).
28
See Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 317, 342–47 (2005); Reed Dickerson, The Interpretation and Application of
Statutes 252–55 (1975); Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1363; Eskridge, Amorous Defendant,
supra note 3, at 2452.
29
See Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1364.
30
See sources cited supra note 6.
27
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advocated overruling a statutory precedent on the grounds that it had
proved unworkable.
A. Evolving Economic Theory Cases
Appendix I provides a list of Supreme Court cases decided between
1970 and 2015 in which a majority, dissenting, or concurring opinion
advocated overturning a statutory precedent.31 This list of cases is
nonexhaustive, although particular attention was paid to identifying
cases decided during the Roberts and Rehnquist Courts (from 1986 to
2015). The Justices who joined in the opinion that advocated overruling
and the reason(s) they provided to justify overruling are listed in the last
two columns.32 As the Appendix shows, in several cases, the Court’s
textualist or textualist-leaning Justices advocated overruling on the
ground that the Court’s initial interpretation was based on an economic
theory that had since been “soundly refuted.”33 Although textualist
Justices succeeded in overruling the precedent in only one of these
cases, their opinions, when taken together, sound a consistent theme that
statutory interpretations based on outdated economic theories should
constitute an exception to the rule of statutory stare decisis.
Consider, for example, Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion in Kimble v.
Marvel Entertainment.34 Kimble involved a provision of the Patent Act,
which grants certain exclusive rights to a patentee and “his heirs or
assigns” and provides that a patent expires twenty years from its

31

See infra Appendix I.
See id.
33
Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2415 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting). See also
Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2418 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring
in the judgement) (urging the Court to overrule a precedent because “[l]ogic, economic
realities, and our subsequent jurisprudence have undermined [its] foundations”); Leegin
Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889 (2007) (justifying Court’s decision
to overrule precedent making resale price maintenance per se illegal in part on grounds that
the “economics literature is replete with procompetitive justifications for a manufacturer’s
use of resale price maintenance”); Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47–
48 (1977) (overruling precedent in part because it had “been the subject of continuing
controversy and confusion, both in the scholarly journals and in the federal courts,” and went
against “[t]he great weight of scholarly opinion”).
34
Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2415.
32
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application date.35 A 1964 precedent, Brulotte v. Thys Co., held that a
patent holder cannot charge royalties for the use of his invention after its
patent term has expired.36 Kimble obtained a patent for a Spider-Maninspired web-slinging toy.37 Marvel later marketed a similar toy, Kimble
sued for patent infringement, and the parties entered a settlement
agreement through which Marvel purchased Kimble’s patent and agreed
to pay Kimble a royalty.38 Some years later, Marvel stumbled upon the
Brulotte decision and sought a declaratory judgment establishing that
Brulotte effectively sunsets the royalty clause in its settlement
agreement with Kimble.39 Kimble countered that Brulotte should be
overruled because it (1) is based on an economic theory—that postpatent-expiration royalties constitute an anti-competitive tying
arrangement—that has since been severely criticized; and (2) creates
several anticompetitive effects of its own.40 Kimble cited numerous law
review articles and treatises41 as well as three Court of Appeals
decisions42 to demonstrate that the Brulotte rule is widely considered
outdated, misguided, and anticompetitive in effect.
A majority of the Court acknowledged that a “broad scholarly
consensus” supported Kimble’s criticism of the Brulotte rule,43 but
nevertheless upheld the rule based almost entirely on statutory stare
decisis.44 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Alito, joined by Justices
35

See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(1), (2) (2012).
379 U.S. 29, 32 (1964).
37
See Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2405.
38
Id. at 2406.
39
See id.
40
See id. at 2412–14.
41
See Brief for Petitioners at ix-xii, Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015) (No.
13-720), 2015 WL 428993.
42
See id. at 15–16 (citing Kimble v. Marvel Enters., Inc., 727 F.3d 856, 857 (9th Cir.
2013) (“Brulotte rule is counterintuitive and its rationale is arguably unconvincing”); Zila,
Inc. v. Tinnell, 502 F.3d 1014, 1019 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that Brulotte is
“economically unconvincing” and has been “criticized roundly”); Scheiber v. Dolby Labs.,
293 F.3d 1014, 1017 (7th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted) (observing that
Brulotte “incorrectly assumes that a patent license has significance after the patent
terminates” and has been “justly[] criticized”).
43
Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2412.
44
Id. at 2412–13. The majority also stressed that Brulotte did not “hinge” on the economic
argument that Kimble criticized. See id. at 2413.
36
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Thomas and Roberts, argued that the Court should have overruled
Brulotte.45 The dissenters’ chief arguments were that (1) the Brulotte
rule was a judicial rule, arrived at through application of an economic
theory, rather than a strict interpretation of the language of the Patent
Act; and (2) the economic theory on which Brulotte was based had been
“soundly refuted” in the fifty years since Brulotte was decided.46
A second economic-theory case in which the textualist Justices
ignored statutory stare decisis also bears mentioning: Leegin Creative
Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.47 Leegin involved a ninety-fiveyear-old statutory precedent, Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park &
Sons Co., in which the Court had ruled that it is per se illegal under the
Sherman Act for a manufacturer to set a minimum price that distributors
must charge for the manufacturer’s goods.48 Unlike in Kimble, the
textualist and textualist-leaning Justices prevailed in Leegin. As in
Kimble, the textualists’ chief reason for abandoning the Dr. Miles
precedent was a supposedly widespread consensus in the economics
literature that resale price maintenance does not necessarily produce
anticompetitive effects and can even have procompetitive effects.49 The
majority opinion recited arguments from numerous treatises, books, and
articles—going on for three full pages—to support its conclusion that it
no longer made sense to follow Dr. Miles’s per se rule.50 It also argued

45
See id. at 2415 (Alito, J., dissenting). Notably, Justices Thomas and Alito voted to
overrule the statutory precedent in all three of the economic theory cases discussed in this
Section. See id.; Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2417 (2014)
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgement); Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc.,
551 U.S. 877, 880 (2007). Justices Scalia and Roberts voted to overrule in two of the three
cases, and Justice Kennedy voted to do so in one case. See Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2415
(Roberts); Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2417 (Scalia), Leegin, 551 U.S. at 880 (Roberts, Scalia,
and Kennedy).
46
Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2415 (Alito, J., dissenting).
47
551 U.S. 877 (2007).
48
220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911).
49
See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 889–92.
50
See id. (citing, e.g., Robert Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 288–91 (1978); Herbert
Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution 184–191 (2005); Bureau of
Economics Staff Report to the FTC, T. Overstreet, Resale Price Maintenance: Economic
Theories and Empirical Evidence 170 (1983); Pauline M. Ippolito, Resale Price
Maintenance: Empirical Evidence from Litigation, 34 J. Law & Econ. 263, 292–93 (1991);
Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement

COPYRIGHT © 2018 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2018]

Textualism and Statutory Precedents

171

that the Dr. Miles rule was inconsistent with other, more recent Supreme
Court decisions.51 The dissenting Justices, mostly purposivists, disputed
the economic-consensus argument, insisting that there was nothing new
in the studies the majority invoked, that the economics literature also
contained arguments supporting the Dr. Miles rule, and that several
congressional actions, including the repeal of a related statute, showed
legislative approval of the Dr. Miles rule.52
Importantly, Leegin involved the Sherman Act, long considered a
“common-law statute” that is supposed to evolve to meet the dynamics
of current economic conditions. Common-law statutes are said to be
phrased in “sweeping, general” language that is meant to confer a broad
delegation of authority to courts to “develop[] legal rules on a case-bycase basis in the common-law tradition.”53 In other words, judges are
supposed to update the Sherman Act to reflect developments in antitrust
law.54
Some commentators have suggested that securities and
intellectual property statutes also should be treated like common law
statutes,55 and the plaintiff (and dissent) in Kimble sought to analogize
the Patent Act to antitrust statutes.56
In one sense, then, the textualist Justices’ eagerness to overrule
precedents based on misguided economic theories could be chalked up
to an exercise of the traditional common-law statutes exception to

Mechanisms, 31 J. Law & Econ. 265, 295 (1988); Frank Mathewson & Ralph Winter, The
Law and Economics of Resale Price Maintenance, 13 Rev. Indus. Org. 57, 74–75 (1998)).
51
See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 901–02.
52
See id. at 908–12, 919 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
53
Guardians Assoc. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 641 n.12 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
54
See, e.g., Leegin, 511 U.S. at 899–900.
55
See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Debunking Blackstonian Copyright, 118 Yale L.J. 1126,
1167 (2009) (calling the Copyright Act a “common law statute”); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1007, 1052 (1989) (calling antifraud provisions of securities laws “common law statutes”); Pierre N. Leval, Trademark:
Champion of Free Speech, 27 Colum. J.L. & Arts 187, 198–99 (2004) (describing the
Lanham Act and the Federal Trademark Dilution Act as “delegating” statutes); Craig Allen
Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U.L. Rev. 51, 53 (2010) (calling
the Patent Act a “common law enabling statute”).
56
See Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2418 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Brulotte was an antitrust decision
masquerading as a patent case.”); Brief for Petitioners, at 11, Kimble v. Marvel Enters., Inc.,
135 S.Ct. 2401 (2015) (No. 13-720), 2015 WL 428993.
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statutory stare decisis. But such a characterization misses something
important: these cases demonstrate a significant, and somewhat
controversial, progression from the traditional common-law statutes
exception. The exception is supposed to apply when the law in the
relevant field—e.g., antitrust, securities, intellectual property—has
changed, not when new academic papers are published questioning or
criticizing the theory the Court has adopted when giving meaning to
broad language in a statutory provision. Yet the textualist Justices seem
to be following a tacit rule that statutory precedents that are based on
economic theories can and should be updated or overruled if the relevant
economic theory—rather than the law in the relevant field—later
evolves. That is, they seem to be recognizing an “incorrect economic
theory” exception to statutory stare decisis. Sections II.A and II.C.1 will
expand on this concept, arguing that textualists’ willingness to update
statutory precedents they believe to be based on outmoded economic
theories is connected to two larger jurisprudential principles: (1) a belief
that statutory precedents that establish a judicial test for implementing a
statutory provision are less binding than those that establish the meaning
of statutory text; and (2) a commitment to finding the one “correct”
statutory reading.
B. Not Quite Stare Decisis: Statutes In Pari Materia
The Court’s textualist Justices also have proved willing to reject
statutory stare decisis in cases involving the application of a precedent
that construes a closely related statute, even when the two statutes
contain identical language and the second statute derived its language in
haec verba from the statute at issue in the initial case.57 The in pari
materia rule directs courts to interpret closely related statutes that
contain the same language or deal with the same subject matter
similarly.58 Thus, if an armed robbery statute has been interpreted to

57
“In haec verba” is a Latin phrase that means “in the same words.” In haec verba,
Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990).
58
See, e.g., Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243 (1972) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (citations omitted) (explaining that statutes addressing the same subject
matter are in pari materia and should be construed “as if they were one law.”); United States
v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 64 (1940) (citations omitted) (same).
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mean “X,” then similar or identical language in a carjacking statute
modeled on that armed robbery statute should be read to mean “X” as
well. In other words, a precedent interpreting statute A is to be applied
to similar or identical language in statute B as well. The Court’s
textualist and textualist-leaning Justices have ignored, or have advocated
ignoring, this rule as well.
Consider, for example, Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.,59 which
construed the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(“ADEA”).60 The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to take
adverse action against an employee “because of such individual’s age.”61
In an earlier case, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,62 the Court63 had
announced a burden-shifting rule for determining when an employer has
taken unlawful adverse action against an employee under identical
language in Title VII prohibiting discrimination “because of such
individual’s . . . sex.”64 Under that test, a plaintiff was required to show
by “direct evidence” that sex “was a substantial factor” in the
employer’s decision. This showing then shifted the burden to the
employer to demonstrate that it would have taken the same adverse
action even absent reliance on the prohibited criteria.65
In Gross, the Court, in a majority opinion authored by arch-textualist
Justice Thomas and joined by the same Justices who overruled the Dr.
Miles precedent in Leegin, voted to overrule Price Waterhouse as
applied to the ADEA.66 The opinion justified this departure from
statutory stare decisis on two grounds. First, it noted that after Price
Waterhouse was decided, Congress amended Title VII to explicitly
endorse the “substantial factor” concept, without similarly amending the
59

557 U.S. 167, 169–70 (2009).
Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2012)).
61
29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2012).
62
490 U.S. 228 (1989).
63
The test was announced in Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion. Because no opinion
garnered five votes, O’Connor’s opinion was considered controlling by most lower courts.
Justice White also concurred, but Justice O’Connor’s opinion was believed to present the
narrowest holding supporting the outcome. See Widiss, Undermining Overrides, supra note
4, at 884.
64
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2(a)(1), (2) (2012).
65
See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276–78 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgement).
66
Gross, 557 U.S. at 167, 170–74 (2009).
60
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ADEA.67 Second, it argued that, “Title VII is materially different [from
the ADEA] with respect to the relevant burden of persuasion.”68 As
commentators have noted, this was a stunning argument, given wellestablished Supreme Court precedent holding that the substantive
provisions of Title VII and the ADEA are to be interpreted identically
because the ADEA was derived “in haec verba” from Title VII.69
Indeed, Justice Kennedy’s Price Waterhouse dissent had assumed that
the plurality’s mixed-motives framework extended to the ADEA,70 and
all the Courts of Appeals that considered the issue before Gross had
unanimously applied Price Waterhouse to ADEA claims.71 Even
respondent’s brief acknowledged the unorthodoxy of treating Title VII
and the ADEA differently, asking the Court to “overrule Price
Waterhouse with respect to its application to the ADEA.”72 Justice
Thomas’s Gross opinion also noted that Price Waterhouse’s burdenshifting framework was difficult for lower courts to apply and stated that
it would be unwise to extend that framework to ADEA claims.73
67

See id. at 173–74.
Id. at 173.
69
See, e.g., Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (quoting Lorillard
v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978)). See generally Northcross v. Bd. of Ed. of Memphis , 412
U.S. 427, 428, (1973) (per curiam) (interpreting the Emergency School Aid Act in light of
the Civil Rights Act as the relevant provisions shared similar language and a “common
raison d’être”). See also Widiss, Undermining Overrides, supra note 4, at 890–92 (“The
majority opinion relegates to a footnote the starting premise . . . that the substantive
provisions of Title VII and the ADEA are generally interpreted identically.”).
70
See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 292 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
71
See Febres v. Challenger Caribbean Corp., 214 F.3d 57, 60 (1st Cir. 2000); Ostrowski v.
Atlantic Mut. Ins., 968 F.2d 171, 173 (2d Cir. 1992); Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
54 F.3d 1089, 1093, 1095 (3d Cir. 1995); EEOC v. Warfield–Rohr Casket Co., 364 F.3d
160, 164 (4th Cir. 2004); Rachid v. Jack In The Box, 376 F.3d 305, 309–12 (5th Cir. 2004);
Wexler v. White’s Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 570-71 (6th Cir. 2003); Visser v.
Packer Eng. Assocs., 924 F.2d 655, 658 (7th Cir. 1991) (en banc); Hutson v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 780 (8th Cir. 1995); Gonzagowski v. Widnall, 115 F.3d 744,
749 (10th Cir. 1997); Lewis v. YMCA, 208 F.3d 1303, 1303–04 (11th Cir. 2000) (per
curiam).
72
Brief for Respondent at 26–40, Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (No.
08-441), 2009 WL 507026.
73
Gross, 557 U.S. at 179. In 1991, after Price Waterhouse and well before Gross was
decided, Congress enacted the 1991 Civil Rights Act, a major statute that sought to override
several highly unpopular Supreme Court Title VII decisions, including Price Waterhouse.
The 1991 CRA replaced Price Waterhouse’s burden-shifting test with an outright ban on
68
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In a similar vein was CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, which
involved Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.74 Section 1981
provides that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States
shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and
enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.”75 The statutory
question in CBOCS was whether Section 1981 encompasses a claim that
an employer has retaliated against an employee for complaining that the
employer violated another person’s Section 1981 rights. In an earlier
case, Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, the Court had construed a related
provision of the Civil Rights Act, Section 1982, to encompass a claim
by a white landowner who alleged retaliation by a homeowners’
association after the landowner protested the association’s
discrimination against the landowner’s black tenant.76 Later cases made
clear that Sullivan stands for the proposition that Section 1982
encompasses retaliation claims.77
The language of Section 1982 is identical to the language of Section
1981, except that Section 1982 guarantees the right “to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property,” rather than the
right to “make and enforce contracts.”78 As with Title VII and the
ADEA, the Court has long construed Sections 1981 and 1982 similarly,
in recognition of these “sister statutes’ common language, origin, and
purposes.”79
using sex or any other prohibited criteria as a “motivating factor” in an employment
decision, as well as limited the effect of an employer’s showing that it would have made the
same decision. The 1991 congressional override is discussed further in Section III.A. What is
important to note here is that the Gross majority opinion did not directly address the 1991
CRA—except to point out that Congress amended only Title VII to allow “mixed motive
claims”—and did not similarly amend the ADEA. Id. at 174.
74
553 U.S. 442, 445 (2008).
75
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2012).
76
396 U.S. 229, 234–35 (1969).
77
See, e.g., Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed., 544 U.S. 167, 176 (2005) (“[I]n Sullivan
we interpreted a general prohibition on racial discrimination [in § 1982] to cover retaliation
against those who advocate the rights of groups protected by that prohibition.”).
78
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982, 1981(a) (2012).
79
See CBOCS, 553 U.S. at 448. Specifically, the Court noted that both § 1981 and § 1982
trace their origins to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Pub. L. No. 39-26, § 1, 14 Stat. 27; that
both provisions “represent[] an immediately post-Civil War legislative effort to guarantee
the then newly freed slaves the same legal rights that other citizens enjoy”; and that both
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In 1989, twenty years after Sullivan, the Court in Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union80 significantly limited the scope of Section 1981, finding
that the phrase “to make and enforce contracts” does not apply to
“conduct by the employer after the contract relation has been
established, including breach of the terms of the contract or imposition
of discriminatory working conditions.”81 Because victims of an
employer’s retaliation often will have opposed discriminatory conduct
that took place after the formation of the employment contract,
Patterson’s holding seemed in practice to foreclose retaliation claims.
However, in 1991, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991
(“CRA”), which overruled Patterson.82
The Court thus faced the question whether Congress’s overruling of
Patterson reinstated the pre-Patterson consensus rule that Sullivan’s
retaliation holding applied to Section 1981 as well as Section 1982. A
majority of the Court ruled that the 1991 CRA amendments did have this
effect, and that:
Sullivan, as interpreted and relied upon by Jackson, as well as the long
line of related cases where we construe Sections 1981 and 1982
similarly, lead us to conclude that the view that Section 1981
encompasses retaliation claims is indeed well embedded in the law.
That being so, considerations of stare decisis strongly support our
adherence to that view.83

Justices Thomas and Scalia dissented, arguing that “the Court’s
holding has no basis in the text of Section 1981.”84 The dissent did not
attack the original Sullivan decision, but maintained that later cases
provisions use “broad language” providing that all citizens or persons within the United
States shall enjoy the same rights enjoyed by white citizens. See id. at 448 (citing Gen. Bldg.
Contractors Ass’n. v. Pa., 458 U.S. 375, 383–84, 388 (1982); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven
Recreation Ass’n, 410 U.S. 431, 439–40, (1973); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409, 441 n.78, (1968)) (noting “shared historical roots” and “strong purposive connection
between the two provisions”).
80
491 U.S. 164 (1989).
81
Id. at 171, 177.
82
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1981).
83
CBOCS, 553 U.S. at 451.
84
Id. at 457–58 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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holding that Section 1982 encompasses retaliation claims misread
Sullivan and ignored the statutory text.85 The most striking thing about
Justice Thomas’s dissent, however, was its bald insistence that even if
Sullivan had “squarely and unambiguously held that Section 1982
provides an implied cause of action for retaliation,” the Court should not
extend Sullivan’s erroneous interpretation of Section 1982 to Section
1981:86
[E]rroneous precedents need not be extended to their logical end, even
when dealing with related provisions that normally would be
interpreted in lockstep. Otherwise, stare decisis, designed to be a
principle of stability and repose, would become a vehicle of change
whereby an error in one area metastasizes into others, thereby
distorting the law.87

In other words, in CBOCS, as in Gross, Justices Thomas and Scalia
argued that statutory precedents should not apply to related provisions in
other statutes when the Court believes that the precedent interpretation is
erroneous or has had undesirable consequences.88 The normative
desirability of such an approach is discussed infra Part III.B. Here, I
simply note that this argument illustrates Justice Thomas’s strong
emphasis on adopting the “correct reading” of the statute and his
unwillingness to put stare decisis ahead of accuracy. Justice Thomas’s
lack of tolerance for “incorrect” statutory constructions is further on
display in several solo dissents in which he alone voted to overrule.89
The cases range in subject area and statute type but demonstrate a shared
resistance to following statutory stare decisis for its own sake.
The borrowed-statute precedent cases discussed in this Section are, of
course, different from the “evolving economic theory” cases in that they
85

Id. at 464–69. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 468–70. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
87
Id. at 469–70. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
88
In a similar vein is Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive
Communities Project, 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2526–31 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing
that erroneous precedents interpreting Title VII and ADEA should not be applied in
interpreting the Fair Housing Act).
89
See, e.g., Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 260–61 (2008) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 363 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Kimbrough
v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 114–16 (2007) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
86
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involve the application of a statutory precedent to a different statute than
the one at issue in the initial case. However, given the longstanding
judicial practice of applying precedents involving Title VII and the
ADEA and Section 1981 and 1982 interchangeably, these cases raise the
same puzzle as the economic-theory cases discussed in the previous
Section: why are the textualist and textualist-leaning Justices willing to
abandon statutory stare decisis for certain statutes in certain cases?
C. “Unworkable” Precedents
Modern textualists also have argued—usually unsuccessfully—that a
statute should be overruled because it has proved “unworkable” or
“confusing” to implement. “Unworkability” is a long-standing,
traditional ground for abandoning a precedent, statutory or otherwise,90
and it has been invoked by jurists of all jurisprudential philosophies.91
But the Court’s textualist Justices seem particularly fond of this form of
argument—and more regularly advocate overruling statutory precedents
based on it than do their purposivist counterparts.
Consider, for example, three recent cases: Altria Group, Inc. v.
Good,92 Holder v. Hall,93 and Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.94
Altria raised the question whether state law claims for fraudulent
misrepresentation against cigarette manufacturers were preempted by
the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969.95 A majority of the
Court concluded that such claims were not preempted, relying heavily
on a prior precedent, Cipollone v. Liggett Group.96 Justice Thomas
90

See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989) (“Another
traditional justification for overruling a prior case is that a precedent may be a positive
detriment to coherence and consistency in the law” as when there is “inherent confusion
created by an unworkable decision”).
91
See, e.g., Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 283 (1988);
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 378 (1970); Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382
U.S. 111, 116 (1965).
92
555 U.S. 70 (2008).
93
512 U.S. 874 (1994).
94
557 U.S. 167 (2009).
95
Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 5(b), 84 Stat. 87, 88 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2012)).
96
Altria, 555 U.S. at 73, 82. Cipollone directed implementing courts to examine each state
law claim individually and ask whether the claim was predicated “on a duty ‘based on
smoking and health.’” 505 U.S. 504, 528–29 (1992) (quoting § 1334(b)).
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dissented, joined by Justices Scalia, Roberts, and Alito.97 His opinion
criticized the Cipollone predicate-duty test as unduly complicated and
confusing and called for overruling it, observing that “lower courts have
consistently expressed frustration at the difficulty in applying the
Cipollone plurality’s test.”98 The dissent argued that “[t]he Court should
not retain an interpretive test that has proved incapable of
implementation” and that “[s]tare decisis considerations carry little
weight when an erroneous governing decision[n] has created an
unworkable legal regime.”99 Finally, the dissent noted that Cipollone
was a plurality decision and argued that it therefore was not binding.100
Recall also that the majority opinion in Gross v. FBL Financial
Services, Inc. invoked unworkability arguments, albeit as a secondary
justification for refusing to apply Price Waterhouse’s burden-shifting
test to the ADEA.101 After explaining that Title VII and the ADEA were
different in material respects, the opinion added that “it has become
evident in the years since [Price Waterhouse] was decided that its
burden-shifting framework is difficult to apply” and “courts have found
it particularly difficult to craft an instruction to explain its burdenshifting framework.”102 Given the difficulties experienced in applying
Price Waterhouse’s framework, the majority insisted, it made no sense
to extend that framework to the ADEA.103 By contrast, Justice Stevens’
purposivist dissenting opinion insisted that Price Waterhouse directly
governed construction of the ADEA and lamented “[the majority’s] utter
disregard of our precedent and Congress’[s] intent.104 The dissent

97

Altria, 555 U.S. at 91.
Id. at 92, 97 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citing lower court opinions).
99
Id. at 97–98 (third alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 501 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring).
100
Id. at 96.
101
557 U.S. 167, 179 (2009).
102
Id. at 173, 179 (emphasis added).
103
Id. at 179.
104
Id. at 182–83 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“That the Court is construing the ADEA rather
than Title VII does not justify this departure from precedent. The relevant language in the
two statutes is identical, and we have long recognized that our interpretations of Title VII’s
language apply ‘with equal force in the context of age discrimination, for the substantive
provisions of the ADEA “were derived in haec verba from Title VII.”’” (quoting Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985)).
98

COPYRIGHT © 2018 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

180

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 104:157

dismissed the majority’s workability concerns by noting that Congress
expressly endorsed the “motivating-factor” framework in its 1991
amendments to Title VII and argued that this legislative endorsement
should trump any workability objections.105
Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Holder v. Hall, joined by Justice
Scalia, echoed the reasoning of the majority opinion in Gross. There, the
Court held that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”) does not
allow challenges to the size of a government body because there is no
objective “ideal” governing body size against which the challenged
governing body can be measured.106 Justice Thomas wrote separately to
advocate that the Court go much further and engage in “a systematic
reassessment of [its] interpretation of § 2.”107 Specifically, he argued that
the Court’s decision in Thornburg v. Gingles,108 which interpreted
Section 2 to reach claims of vote “dilution,” should be overruled.109 In
his view, “the gloss” Gingles placed on the statute “is at odds with the
terms of the statute and has proved utterly unworkable in practice.”110
Justice Thomas’s opinion also complained that Gingles was “based on a
flawed method of statutory construction,” characterized the Gingles
implementation test as “a disastrous misadventure in judicial
policymaking,” and argued that “by construing the Act to cover
potentially dilutive electoral mechanisms, we have immersed the federal
courts in a hopeless project of weighing questions of political theory.”111
The cases discussed in this Part range in subject matter—from
antidiscrimination law to patent law, antitrust law, criminal sentencing,
and preemption. Despite the differences in subject matter, however,
similar themes about precedents that are “not really statutory
interpretation”112 or that are too erroneous to deserve adherence resound

105

Id. at 185–87 (“Because Congress has codified a mixed-motives framework for Title
VII cases—the vast majority of antidiscrimination lawsuits—the Court’s concerns about that
framework are of no moment.”).
106
Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 885 (1994).
107
Id. at 892 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgement).
108
478 U.S. 30, 46 (1986).
109
Holder, 512 U.S. at 945 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
110
Id. at 892.
111
Id. at 892–93, 945.
112
Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2415 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting).
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in the textualist-authored opinions that advocate rejecting a statutory
precedent.
Finally, it is worth noting that while this Article focuses on the U.S.
Supreme Court, committed textualist jurists on other courts also have
shown a marked proclivity for overruling statutory precedents.113 The
113
A prominent example is the Michigan Supreme Court, which gained a textualist
majority from 1998 to 1999, when Michigan Governor John Engler appointed four new
Justices—each an avowed textualist—to the court. See Abbe R. Gluck, The States as
Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and The New Modified
Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1803–04 (2010). Justice Stephen Markman, for example,
had worked in the Reagan Administration’s Office of Legal Policy and was credited with
helping to put in place a “new generation of textualist judges.” Id. at 1804; see also Cornell
W. Clayton, The Politics of Justice: The Attorney General and the Making of Legal Policy
151 (1992) (describing Markman’s influence in the Office of Legal Policy); T.R. Goldman,
The Flower of the Reagan Revolution (John Roberts, Jr.), Free Republic (Aug. 4, 2005),
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1457017/posts (same). Likewise, Justice Maura
Corrigan had argued in speeches and law review articles that courts should adopt textualism
in order to achieve “a disciplined interpretive approach.” Maura D. Corrigan, Textualism in
Action: Judicial Restraint on the Michigan Supreme Court, 8 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 261, 263–
64 (2004). These textualist appointees quickly overruled numerous statutory precedents;
indeed, in the newly constituted court’s first five years, its textualist majority overruled more
statutory precedents than the court had done during any previous period in the state’s history.
See Gluck, supra, at 1804 & n.195 (citing Corrigan, supra, at 264); Nelson P. Miller,
“Judicial Politics”: Restoring the Michigan Supreme Court, Mich. B.J., Jan. 2006, at 38;
Robert A. Sedler, The Michigan Supreme Court, Stare Decisis, and Overruling the
Overrulings, 55 Wayne L. Rev. 1911, 1929–30 & n.81 (2009); Clifford W. Taylor, A
Government of Laws, and Not of Men, 22 T.M. Cooley L. Rev. 199, 208 (2005)); Todd C.
Berg, Marilyn Kelly Named New Michigan Supreme Court Chief Justice, Mich. Law.
Wkly., Jan. 12, 2009 (noting that the court overruled sixty-one precedents between 2000 and
2005, compared with eighteen in the prior five-year period). {Master: Spacing in this FN}
For examples of such cases, see Haynie v. State, 664 N.W.2d 129, 132, 135 (Mich. 2003)
(overruling Koester v. City of Novi, 580 N.W.2d 835 (Mich. 1998)); Gladych v. New Family
Homes, 664 N.W.2d 705, 706 (Mich. 2003) (overruling Buscaino v. Rhodes, 189 N.W.2d
202 (Mich. 1971)); Rednour v. Hastings Mutual Ins. Co., 661 N.W.2d 562, 564–65, 567
(Mich. 2003) (overruling Nickerson v. Citizens Mut. Ins., 224 N.W.2d 896 (Mich. 1975));
Pohutski v. City of Allen Park, 641 N.W.2d 219, 224 (Mich. 2002) (overruling Hadfield v.
Oakland Co. Drain Comm’r, 422 N.W.2d 205 (Mich. 1988)); Sington v. Chrysler Corp., 648
N.W.2d 624, 627 (Mich. 2002) (overruling Haske v. Transp. Leasing, 566 N.W.2d 896
(Mich. 1997)); Brown v. Genesee Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 628 N.W.2d 471, 474 & n.4 (Mich.
2001) (overruling Green v. Dep’t of Corrections, 192 N.W.2d 491 (Mich. 1971)); Nawrocki
v. Macomb Cty. Rd. Comm’n, 615 N.W.2d 702, 709, 718 (Mich. 2000) (overruling Pick v.
Szymczak, 548 N.W.2d 603 (Mich. 1996)); Robinson v. City of Detroit, 613 N.W.2d 307,
311 (Mich. 2000) (overruling Fiser v. Ann Arbor, 339 N.W.2d 413 (Mich. 1983); Rogers v.
Detroit, 579 N.W.2d 840 (Mich. 1998)). But see People v. Hawkins, 668 N.W.2d 602, 618,
622 (Mich. 2003) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting) (chastising court for disregarding “the strong

COPYRIGHT © 2018 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

182

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 104:157

little that we know about state experiences with statutory stare decisis
lends support to this Article’s central claim that the disregard for
statutory stare decisis displayed by textualist Justices on the U.S.
Supreme Court is no accident but, rather, a natural corollary to the
textualist jurisprudential approach—or, perhaps, to jurisprudential
tendencies that make an individual judge likely to associate herself with
a textualist interpretive philosophy.114
II. SOME THEORIES AND LESSONS
It may be tempting, in reviewing the above cases, to conclude that
textualist Justices’ willingness to abandon statutory stare decisis can be
explained simply by judicial ideology. After all, the Roberts Court’s
textualist and textualist-leaning Justices also are its most conservative
Justices, while its purposivist Justices tend to be more liberal.115 Further,
several of the cases in which textualist Justices have voted to overrule a
precedent or refused to apply it to a closely related statute have involved
antidiscrimination statutes that initially were interpreted in an expansive
manner—that is, in keeping with liberal policy preferences. Likewise,
the textualist opinions in the evolving economic theory cases tend to
support overruling precedents that restrict certain business arrangements
or make it easier for shareholders to sue corporations—and thus are
consistent with laissez-faire, corporation-friendly, conservative policy
preferences. So we could interpret textualist Justices’ economic
dynamism, stinginess with precedents based on related statutes, and
heightened readiness to overturn precedents that have proved
unworkable as merely an effort by the Courts’ conservatives to negate
precedents adopted by more liberal predecessor Courts. Conversely, we
could read purposivist Justices’ insistence on following statutory stare
decisis in those same cases as a corresponding attempt by the Court’s
liberal jurists to protect liberal precedents.

presumption that a high court’s construction of a statute should be given a heightened stare
decisis effect”).
114
See infra note 182.
115
But cf. Margaret H. Lemos, The Politics of Statutory Interpretation, 89 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 849, 854 (2013) (book review) (acknowledging this but arguing that there is nothing
inherently conservative about textualism).
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There is likely some truth to this account. But while ideological
considerations certainly may have played some role in the Justices’ votes
in some of the cases, they provide an imperfect explanation for a number
of others. The Patent Act case, Kimble, for example, does not seem to
have a clear liberal-versus-conservative dividing line—indeed, all the
Justices seemed to agree that the Brulotte rule was a bad one as a matter
of policy—and an odd assortment of the liberal Justices plus Justices
Scalia and Kennedy voted to uphold the rule.116 Further, ideology does
not seem sufficient to explain Justice Thomas’s lone dissents advocating
overruling statutory precedents in cases such as Kimbrough and Preston,
where all the other Justices, conservative and liberal alike, voted to
follow the precedent.117 Moreover, very few of the Court’s opinions
advocating overruling a statutory precedent garnered all five (or even
four) of the conservative Justices’ votes.118 Thus, while this Article does
not mean to discount the role that ideology may have played in some of
the cases discussed in Part I, it argues that there is more than just
ideology at work in these cases.
Indeed, two themes emerge from the cases examined in Part I and
listed in Appendix I. First, most of the cases involve statutory
constructions that established a decision-making rule or test for
implementing a statutory provision, rather than a simple holding that a
statutory word or phrase means “Y.”119 Second, many of the cases
involve textualist arguments that a precedent should be overruled
because it simply “got the meaning of the statute wrong” or was based

116

See Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2412–13 (2015).
See Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 363 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Kimbrough v.
United States, 552 U.S. 85, 114–16 (2007) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
118
See infra Appendix I (reporting only three such cases, out of thirty-one). These cases
were Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (five votes), Altria Group,
Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70 (2008) (four votes), and Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v.
PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (five votes).
119
See, e.g., Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2407–08, 2412; Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v.
Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2516–18 (2015); Halliburton v. Erica P. John
Fund, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2405-07 (2014); Gross, 557 U.S. at 171–73; John R. Sand & Gravel
Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133–35 (2008); Altria, 555 U.S. at 80–82; Preston, 552
U.S. at 352–53; Leegin, 551 U.S. at 881–82, 887; Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 90–91; State Oil
Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 7, 12 (1997); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 878, 880 (1994).
117
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on an economic theory that has since been “debunked.”120 This Part
argues that these two observations reflect important, and thus far underappreciated, corollaries to textualists’ jurisprudential philosophy.
Section A explains that textualism’s focus on the statutory text and
hostility towards judicial policymaking seems to translate into a view
that statutory decisions which establish a test for implementing a statute
are somehow less authoritative than decisions that hold that the text of
“X” provision means “Y.” Section B examines how this
“implementation test” insight might explain textualist Justices’
dismissive treatment of congressional overrides in a number of cases
that have surprised scholars. Section C suggests two additional
explanations for textualists’ willingness to overrule statutory precedents:
(1) textualism’s interpretive methodology lends itself to a “correct
answer” mindset that makes it difficult for textualist jurists to accept a
statutory construction they believe “gets it wrong”; and (2) at least some
textualists view themselves as judicial revolutionaries, seeking to
reshape how courts interpret statutes, and thus are willing to break a few
eggs (i.e., overrule a few cases) along the way.
A. “Implementation Tests” Are Different
A prominent theme, or argument, that runs through several of the
cases discussed in Part I is that the precedent the textualist Justices
would overrule is “not really statutory interpretation” at all but, rather,
some form of judicial policymaking. Typically, the precedents at issue
involve a judicial test or rule for implementing a statutory provision as
opposed to a simple holding that “X” word or phrase means “Y.” That
is, such cases establish that “ABC” test or rule is to be used to decide
120

See, e.g., Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2415–17 (Alito, J., dissenting) (economic theory);
Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2418 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (economic theory);
Gross, 557 U.S. at 173–75 (text); Altria, 555 U.S. at 92, 95–96, 106–07 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (text); CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 457–58, 464 (2008)
(Thomas, J., dissenting)(text); Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 260–61 (2008)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (text); Preston, 552 U.S. at 363 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (text);
Leegin, 551 U.S. at 899–900 (economic theory); Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 114–16 (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (text); Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 402–03 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (text); Holder, 512 U.S. at 892, 945 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)
(text); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 670–73 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(text).
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whether a particular action falls within “X” statutory provision—as
opposed to that “X statutory provision means Y.” Some of the “not
really statutory interpretation” cases involve a test or interpretation that
is only loosely connected to a statutory anchor, such as the test for
determining when a practice constitutes a “restraint of trade” in the
economic-theory cases. Implementation tests are also prevalent in cases
involving antidiscrimination statutes, such as Title VII (e.g., burdens of
proof), and procedural statutes, such as those establishing limitations
periods or jurisdictional rules.121
The distinction between text-parsing statutory interpretation and
implementation tests is one that the Justices themselves have hinted at in
some cases—although any discussion they have offered has been brief
and undeveloped. In Kimble, for example, the textualist dissenting
opinion urged the Court to overrule Brulotte on the ground that the rule
established in Brulotte was “not based on anything that can plausibly be
regarded as an interpretation of the terms of the Patent Act,” that it was
“a bald act of policymaking” and “was not really statutory interpretation
at all.”122 Similarly, in another economic theory case, Halliburton, the
Court reconsidered a precedent that dictated how investors must prove
the reliance element of the implied Rule 10b-5 cause of action—a test
that governed implementation of a regulation.123 The precedent case,
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, created an evidentiary presumption that the price
of stock traded in an efficient market reflects all public, material
information.124 Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion, which advocated
overruling Basic, argued that “Basic, of course, has nothing to do with
statutory interpretation. . . . [It] concerned a judge-made evidentiary
presumption for a judge-made element of the implied 10b-5 private
cause of action, itself ‘a judicial construct that Congress did not enact in
the text of the relevant statutes.’”125 Recall that in Holder v. Hall, Justice
Thomas’s concurring opinion likewise characterized the precedent
case’s “totality of the circumstances” test for implementing Section 2 of
121

See infra Appendix I.
Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2415 (Alito, J., dissenting).
123
134 S. Ct. at 2405.
124
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245, 249–50 (1988).
125
Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. 2398 at 2425 (2014) (quoting Stoneridge Inv. Partners v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 164 (2008)).
122
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the Voting Rights Act as a “disastrous misadventure in judicial
policymaking.”126
At first blush, such comments may sound like an excuse or a flimsy
attempt to justify a seemingly heretical departure from statutory stare
decisis. But on closer consideration, these grumblings about judicial
policymaking reflect a significant and unappreciated difference between
textualist and purposivist jurisprudential views about statutory
constructions that involve implementation tests—as opposed to
constructions that directly parse statutory language. That is, when the
precedent interpretation adopts a judge-made implementation test,
textualists view that interpretation as more like common-law decisionmaking than traditional statutory interpretation.127
Further, because an interpretation that adopts an implementation test
is not saying, “Here is what Congress enacted into law,” but only, “Here
is how courts should apply what Congress enacted into law,” and
because the test is judicially created, textualist Justices view the
interpretation (and test) as open to revision by subsequent Courts who
believe the test to be misguided, contrary to statutory text, unworkable,
costly to implement, or out of step with subsequent legal developments.
In other words, if any of the reasons cited as justifying the overruling of
a common-law precedent is present with respect to an implementationtest precedent, textualist Justices are likely to consider that reason
sufficient to justify overruling the implementation test.
One reason textualists give for making such a distinction between
implementation-test and text-parsing precedents is that the separation126
Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 893 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). See
also discussion infra Part II.C (analyzing the textualists’ “correct answer” mindset and their
self-image as jurisprudential revolutionaries).
127
The textualist opinions in the non-antitrust economic-theory cases go out of their way
to argue that the statutes at issue in those cases are like common-law statutes—because
securities laws largely have been developed by courts, see Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2425–
26 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment), or because the precedent case was essentially
an antitrust case “masquerading” as a patent case, see Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2418 (Alito, J.,
dissenting). This Article argues that the fact that the precedents at issue involved
implementation tests rather than ordinary text-parsing statutory interpretation at least
contributed to textualist Justices’ view of the original precedents as common-law
equivalents—and that the implementation-test exception helps explain textualist Justices’
willingness to overturn precedents in other cases that do not involve statutes that even
arguably could be considered “common-law statutes.”
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of-powers concerns that justify statutory stare decisis are not present—
or at least are significantly diminished—with implementation tests. That
is, Congress is not necessarily the institution best suited to update or
correct errors in a judicially created test designed to help lower courts
implement a statutory provision. Congress does not, for instance,
monitor how well an implementation test is working in the lower courts
or pay attention to lower-court criticism of such tests.128 The Supreme
Court, by contrast, in its role as overseer of the judicial system, might
more organically be in touch with lower court experiences employing an
implementation test established by one of its earlier cases.129
Some of the textualist-authored opinions in the cases discussed in Part
I and listed in Appendix I have explicitly acknowledged the different
institutional dynamics at work when a statutory interpretation adopts an
implementation test versus a text-parsing construction. In Kimble, for
example, Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion insisted that
we do not give super-duper protection to decisions that do not actually
interpret a statute. When a precedent is based on a judge-made rule
and is not grounded in anything that Congress has enacted, we cannot
“properly place on the shoulders of Congress” the entire burden of
correcting “the Court’s own error.”130

Similarly, Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion in Halliburton argued
that,
[i]n statutory cases, it is perhaps plausible that Congress watches over
its enactments and will step in to fix our mistakes, so we may leave to
Congress the judgment whether the interpretive question is better left
“‘settled’” or “‘settled right.’” But this rationale is untenable when it
comes to judge-made law like “implied” private causes of action,
which we retain a duty to superintend. . . . [W]hen we err in areas of

128
See Barrett, supra note 28, at 342–47 (arguing that Congress has little incentive to
monitor court of appeals decisions).
129
Indeed, even apart from the Court’s official role as head of the judicial system, its
members are likely to have formal and informal interactions with lower-court judges, which
might give rise to inter-court chatter about cases and precedents.
130
Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2418 (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting Girouard v.
United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69–70 (1946)).
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judge-made law, we ought to presume that Congress expects us to
correct our own mistakes—not the other way around.131

In other words, when the judiciary fashions a test to help courts apply
the text of a statute, rather than merely identifies the “correct meaning”
of statutory text, textualists view any problems with that test as within
the judiciary’s prerogative, as well as its responsibility, to correct.
Perhaps the reason for this, suggested by Justice Thomas’s discussion in
Halliburton, is that mistakes in judicial interpretation of the statute’s text
can or should signal to Congress that that text needs correction or
clarification; whereas mistakes in a judicially crafted test for
implementing a statute are more difficult for Congress to correct.
Indeed, in order to correct an implementation test, Congress would have
to amend or alter the terms of a judicial holding, rather than the text of a
statute—or at least would have to mention the judicially created test in
the text of the corrective amendment. Congress has at times done
precisely this—the Civil Rights Act of 1991 is a prime example132—but
such legislative corrections of judicially crafted tests are awkward and
often themselves meet with judicial resistance in subsequent
application.133
Purposivist Justices, by contrast, do not seem to view statutory
precedents that create implementation tests as less binding than
precedents that adopt a straightforward holding that a statutory word or
phrase means “X.” Or, at least, purposivist Justices regularly seem to
vote to uphold such implementation tests, citing statutory stare decisis.
What accounts for this difference? One possible explanation is that
purposivists treat implementation tests differently than do textualists
because purposivists are, on the whole, more comfortable with tests and
factors than are textualists. In this sense, the implementation-test divide
may be a close cousin of the rules–standards divide that tends to break
along textualist–purposivist lines.134
131
Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2425–26 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis
added) (citations omitted) (quoting Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, 476 U.S.
409, 424 (1986)).
132
See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071.
133
See infra Section II.B.
134
Briefly, the rules-versus-standards debate acknowledges that judges have a choice,
when articulating legal policies, between establishing clear, bright-line rules—e.g., “No one
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As scholars have observed, textualists have shown a heightened
preference for rules over standards, whereas purposivists and
intentionalists have proved more comfortable with standards (though not
necessarily to prefer them over rules).135 Thus, for example, textualists
are less willing than jurists who subscribe to other interpretive
approaches to recognize case-by-case exceptions to a statutory rule on
the ground that the rule is over- or under-inclusive.136 Moreover,
textualists “enthusiastically deploy canons of construction, with special
emphasis on the more rule-like of the canons.”137 Accordingly, it is
possible that textualists are more willing to overrule precedents that
involve implementation tests at least in part because such tests
essentially establish “standards”—giving courts guidelines for how to
apply a statute and leaving significant room for judicial discretion—
rather than fixed rules. Purposivists, on the other hand, may be more
comfortable with tests that allow for judicial discretion on a case-bycase basis. Indeed, they may view judicial discretion in the application
of a statute as a good thing—on the theory that it enables courts to
ensure that the statute is implemented consistently with Congress’s
purpose in individual cases.
On a second, deeper level, the difference between purposivists’ and
textualists’ attitudes towards implementation test precedents may reflect
an under-appreciated difference between the two interpretive theories’
visions of the proper role of the Court in statutory interpretation.
Specifically, textualists seem to view the Court as more of a monitor, or
supervisor, of the lower courts and the legal system as a whole than do
purposivists. Purposivists, by contrast, seem to view the Court as more
may drive over sixty-five miles per hour”—versus establishing flexible standards—e.g., “No
one may drive at an excessive speed.” Whereas rules are absolute and straightforward,
standards are somewhat open-ended and require further judicial evaluation at the
implementation stage. Whereas rules are predictable, clear, and categorical, standards require
case-by-case analysis. For general discussions of the distinction between rules and standards,
see Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J.
Legal Stud. 257, 258 (1974); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic
Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557, 559–60 (1992); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991
Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22, 58–59 (1992).
135
See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 16, at 372–403.
136
See id. at 381–83.
137
John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 Va. L. Rev. 419, 422 (2005).
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of a faithful agent of Congress than do textualists. Or perhaps it is more
accurate to say that both textualists and purposivists view the Court as
both a monitor and a faithful agent, but that textualists place greater
emphasis on the monitor role, while purposivists place greater weight on
the faithful agent role.
I have elsewhere observed that the Roberts Court’s conservative
Justices—who also tend to be its most textualist and textualist-leaning
Justices—seem more focused on ensuring that a particular statutory
construction works well within the legal system than do their liberal,
often purposivist, counterparts.138 For example, when these Justices pay
attention to the practical consequences that a particular interpretation is
likely to produce, they tend to emphasize administrability concerns—
e.g., whether the interpretation will waste judicial resources, prove
impossible to administer, or result in unclear or unpredictable rules.139 In
the context of statutory stare decisis, I believe this translates into a
greater willingness on the part of these Justices to overrule a statutory
precedent that is giving lower courts difficulty. Indeed, a number of the
textualist opinions that advocate overruling statutory precedents have
cited the problems that lower courts have had implementing the
precedent, sometimes quoting directly from lower court opinions
criticizing the precedent.140

138
See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s First Era:
An Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis, 62 Hastings L.J. 221, 225 (2010).
139
Id. at 226, 244–45.
140
See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167, 179 (2009) (citing Tyler v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1179 (2d Cir. 1992)) (referring to “the murky water
of shifting burdens in discrimination cases”); Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 97
(2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Good v. Altria Grp., Inc., 436 F. Supp. 2d 132, 142
(D. Me. 2006)) (“‘[C]ourts remain divided about what the [Cippollone] decision means and
how to apply it’ and . . . ‘Cipollone’s distinctions, though clear in theory, defy clear
application.’”); Visser v. Packer Eng’g Assocs., 924 F.2d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 1991) (Flaum,
J., dissenting) (citing judicial difficulty in formulating burden-shifting instructions and juror
difficulty in applying such instructions). See also Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 892 (1994)
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that precedent has forced lower courts to
grapple with inherently political questions); Hilton v. S. C. Pub. Rys. Comm’n, 502 U.S.
197, 212 (1991) (“It will be difficult, if not impossible, for lower courts to know” how to the
implement test at issue). See also discussion infra Section II.C (exploring textualists’
“correct answer” mindset).
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This lower-court-monitor function may also explain something
puzzling about the evolving economic-theory cases. In many of these
cases, textualist Justices advocated replacing a clear, easy-to-administer
test or interpretation with one that is more complicated for courts to
administer. In Kimble, for example, they would have replaced Brulotte’s
straightforward rule (“No royalties after the patent expires”) with
antitrust law’s open-ended rule of reason (an “elaborate inquiry” that
requires courts to conduct “a full-fledged” economic analysis of a
royalty clause’s likely effect on competition).141 This is curious because,
as I have shown elsewhere, the textualist Justices have in numerous
other cases rejected statutory constructions that would be messy to
implement, citing the practical difficulties and confusion that such
constructions would produce for lower courts.142
But textualists’ emphasis on the Court as monitor or supervisor of the
lower courts readily explains this seeming anomaly: the Court’s
willingness to adopt the messier test in such cases may stem, in part,
from the fact that lower courts have found the clear, simple test difficult
to administer, or have criticized it for some other reason. Kimble is again
a good example. Although the Brulotte precedent adopted a simple,
easy-to-administer rule—whereas the dissenters’ preferred “rule of
reason” test was more complicated—lower courts charged with
administering the Brulotte rule had severely criticized it.143 Thus, the
dissenting Justices may have viewed their monitoring role as best
fulfilled by jettisoning a precedent that lower courts had denounced—
141
See Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2408–09, 2411 (2015) (citing Brief for
Petitioner at 45). Indeed, the majority opinion pointed this out and stressed the simplicity of
the Brulotte rule in comparison to the “rule of reason” advocated by the dissenters. See id. at
2411. See also, e.g., Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2418–19 (2014)
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (advocating replacing a simple rule that presumed
reliance on defendant’s misrepresentations with a messy, fact-specific judicial inquiry into
whether particular plaintiffs in fact relied on defendant’s misstatements); Leegin Creative
Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007) (replacing Dr. Miles’s per se rule
against vertical price restraints with them the “rule of reason” test).
142
See Anita S. Krishnakumar, The Anti-Messiness Principle in Statutory Interpretation,
87 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1465, 1507–12 (2012). See also William N. Eskridge, Jr. et al.,
Cases and Materials on Legislation and Regulation: Statutes and the Creation of Public
Policy 1210 & n.178 (5th ed. 2014) (citing this principle).
143
See Zila, Inc. v. Tinnell, 502 F.3d 1014, 1019–20 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2007); Scheiber v.
Dolby Labs., Inc., 293 F.3d 1014, 1017–18 (7th Cir. 2002).
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even though that precedent established a test that was seemingly simple
on its face.
Purposivist Justices, by contrast, may be more willing to stick with
old implementation-test precedents than are their textualist counterparts,
even in the face of lower-court criticism, because they view the act of
creating an implementation test as a judicial effort to effectuate
Congress’s goals in enacting the statute. That is, because purposivists
are not focused exclusively on the text of the statute, they may not view
the judicial adoption of an implementation test that is one step removed
from the text as a “bald act of judicial policymaking.”144 Rather, they
may view such tests as part and parcel of the judicial process of ensuring
that Congress’s purpose is fulfilled when a statute is applied to concrete
legal disputes.
Moreover, once the Court has put forth an interpretation that does its
best to give effect to Congress’s purpose—whether that interpretation
takes the form of an implementation test or a text-parsing statutory
construction—purposivists view it as the exclusive province of the
principal, Congress, to decide whether that interpretation accords with
the statute’s purpose and to correct the interpretation if necessary. As the
majority opinion in Kimble argued,
[W]e apply statutory stare decisis even when a decision has
announced a “judicially created doctrine” designed to implement a
federal statute. All our interpretive decisions, in whatever way
reasoned, effectively become part of the statutory scheme, subject
(just like the rest) to congressional change. Absent special
justification, they are balls tossed into Congress’s court, for
acceptance or not as that branch elects.145

Because judicial fulfillment of statutory purpose is purposivists’
lodestar—rather than judicial cracking of a linguistic code—purposivists
do not view implementation test precedents as different in kind, or less
deserving of deference, than ordinary statutory interpretation precedents.
Moreover, they do not seem to view their primary role in superintending
such tests to be to ensure that lower courts are able to administer them.
144
145

Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2415 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2409 (citations omitted).
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Rather, they seem to view their role to be to ensure that any
implementation test they adopt continues to effectuate Congress’s
purpose as times change—and they accordingly view Congress, rather
than the courts, as the appropriate arbiter of such tests’ effectiveness.
Indeed, because purposivism as an interpretive methodology is more
focused on legislative intent and is comfortable making inferences about
such intent based on legislative behavior, it makes sense that
purposivists are far more willing than their textualist colleagues to take
their cues from Congress when it comes to overturning a precedent.
Purposivists also seem more willing to assume that Congress pays
attention to judicially crafted implementation tests and to infer
congressional approval of an implementation test from legislative
inaction following the adoption of such a test.146 In the purposivist
jurist’s eyes, the judicial invalidation of an implementation test that
Congress has left in place—thereby signaling its implicit approval, much
as traditional principals signal ratification of their agents’ actions
through silence—may seem like the act of a faithless legislative agent.
Appendix I lists thirty-one Supreme Court cases in which at least one
member of the Court advocated overruling a statutory precedent. Of
these thirty-one cases, only nine contained explicit arguments that the
precedent at issue constituted judicial policymaking or was not “real
statutory interpretation” and therefore was not entitled to the superstrong presumption of correctness afforded by statutory stare decisis.147
But over half of the cases in the Appendix (seventeen of thirty-one, or
54.8%) involved implementation test precedents.148 Because the cases
146
See, e.g., Leegin, 551 U.S. at 908 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that Congress has
repeatedly refused to overturn the Dr. Miles’s per se rule).
147
See Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2415 (Alito, J., dissenting); Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty.
Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2528–29 (2015) (Thomas, J.
dissenting) (arguing that the disparate impact test was created by an agency, not Congress,
and that it defies the statute’s text); Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
2398, 2425–27 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good,
555 U.S. 70, 106–07 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S.
85, 114–16 (2007) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Leegin, 551 U.S. at 899–900, 905 (2007);
Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 892–93 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment);
Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 675–76 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); City of
Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 842 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting); infra Appendix I.
148
See Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2408–09 (“unreasonable restraint of trade” test); Tex. Dep’t of
Hous., 135 S. Ct. at 2516–18 (disparate-impact test); Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2409
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listed in the Appendix are based on word searches and are not
exhaustive, I do not want to overstate the significance of these
percentages.149 But these crude numbers suggest that when the members
of the Court are willing to overturn a statutory precedent, they are often
dealing with a precedent they may view as less binding because it
imposes a decision-making rule for implementing a statute rather than
directly construes the statute’s text.
B. Implementation Tests, Legislative Overrides, and “Shadow
Precedents”
The implementation-test distinction illuminated in Section A has
important implications not just for the Court’s treatment of its own
statutory precedents—but for its treatment of the related category of
statutory precedents that Congress chooses to override by amendment or
new law. This Section discusses the phenomenon of “shadow
precedents”—that is, statutory precedents that Congress has overridden
(“reliance on material misrepresentation” test); Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 112–14 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“reasonableness” of criminal sentences); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S.
167, 176–77 (2009) (burden of proof rule for demonstrating discrimination “because of”
age); Altria, 555 U.S. at 76–77 (test for determining whether state law is preempted); John
R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133–34 (2008) (test for whether
statute of limitations is jurisdictional); Leegin, 551 U.S. at 885–86 (“unreasonable restraint
of trade” test); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (“unreasonable restraint of
trade” test); Holder, 512 U.S. at 880, 880 n.1 (“totality of the circumstances” test under the
Voting Rights Act); Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 275–
77 (1988) (test for appealability of a district court order denying motion to stay or dismiss);
Johnson, 480 U.S. at 631–33 (test for determining whether an employer engaged in “sex”
discrimination); Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 810 (standard for imposing liability on cities under §
1983); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113–15 (1985) (test for distinguishing questions of
fact from questions of law); Cont’l T.V. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49–50 (1977)
(“unreasonable restraint of trade” test); Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers AFL-CIO v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132, 137–38 (1976) (test for
“unfair labor practice” under NLRA); Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375,
393 (1970) (test for determining whether there is a cause of action for wrongful death); infra
Appendix I.
149
Most of the cases in the Appendix were identified through a search of the Westlaw
database using the parameters “‘stare decisis’ /s overrule!” I reviewed the search results and
eliminated cases that failed to advocate overruling a statutory precedent (e.g., cases that
discussed overruling a constitutional precedent). I also supplemented this word search with
cases I independently knew to contain arguments in favor of overruling a statutory
precedent.
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but that lower courts and even the Supreme Court itself nevertheless
continue to follow.150 It posits that part of the reason for textualists’
reluctance to give full effect to congressional overrides in such cases
may be that the overridden precedent established an implementation test,
which the Court views as its responsibility—rather than Congress’s—to
update.
As noted earlier, one of the central justifications for heightened
deference to statutory precedents is that when a judicial construction of a
statute is incorrect, Congress has the power to correct it. Several
academic studies have sought to measure empirically how often
Congress actually steps in to override the Supreme Court’s statutory
interpretation decisions.151 Some of these studies attempt to identify
factors that correlate with congressional enactment of an override, such
as statutory subject matter or the interpretive tools (e.g., plain meaning)
the Court used to construe the statute.152 Two recent qualitative studies
have examined how courts respond when Congress in fact overrides a
statutory interpretation precedent. Relying on observations in the
employment-law field, these studies show that courts sometimes give
surprisingly limited reach to congressional override statutes—often
continuing to apply overridden precedents to new situations that at least
arguably should be covered by the override.153
The implementation-test distinction identified in Section A suggests a
new explanation for the “shadow precedent” phenomenon. Insofar as the
150

I borrow this term from Deborah Widiss. See Widiss, Shadow Precedents, supra note 4.
See sources cited supra note 4. See also Lori Hausegger & Lawrence Baum, Behind the
Scenes: The Supreme Court and Congress in Statutory Interpretation, in Great Theatre: The
American Congress in the 1990s, at 224, 233-40 (Herbert F. Weisberg & Samuel C.
Patterson eds., 1998) (using empirical methods to determine when Congress will be more
likely to overrule a decision by the Court); James Buatti & Richard L. Hasen, Conscious
Congressional Overriding of the Supreme Court, Gridlock, and Partisan Politics, 93 Texas L.
Rev. See Also 263 (2015) (measuring the number of “conscious” congressional overrides);
Matthew R. Christiansen, William N. Eskridge Jr. & Sam N. Thypin-Bermeo, The
Conscious Congress: How Not to Define Overrides, 93 Tex. L. Rev. See Also 289 (2015)
(critiquing whether “conscious” overrides is a helpful metric in assessing Congress-Court
relations).
152
See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 4, at 1387–1413; Eskridge, supra note 4, at
343–49.
153
See Widiss, Shadow Precedents, supra note 4; Widiss, Undermining Overrides, supra
note 4.
151
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Court’s textualist and textualist-leaning Justices view implementation
test precedents as the equivalent of common-law rulemaking, rather than
traditional statutory interpretation, they may believe that revisions to
such tests should be the exclusive province of the judiciary, rather than
Congress. Indeed, they may regard legislative tinkering with such tests
as an illegitimate usurpation of judicial authority. Accordingly, these
Justices may be inclined to give a narrow reading to congressional
overrides of judicially crafted tests. That is, textualist Justices may take
the view that when the Court adopts a judge-made test for implementing
a statute, the Court should be willing to change the test if it proves
wrong or unworkable—much as the Court does with constitutional and
common-law decisions. However, when an implementation test is
changed by Congress, through an override, these same Justices may take
the view that the Court should read that change narrowly and give
meaning only to the precise change Congress enacts. In other words,
textualists may view congressional overrides of judicially crafted
implementation tests somewhat like courts in an earlier era viewed
statutes in derogation of the common law—as pesky legislative
intrusions to be given limited effect.154
Indeed, in some cases it almost seems as if the Court’s textualists
have created a de facto clear-statement rule for congressional overrides
of implementation test precedents.155 That is, they appear to have
adopted an unspoken rule that the original shadow precedent continues
to apply in all situations other than those that are clearly covered by the
override. Thus, if Congress wishes for the override to apply broadly, it
must either explicitly declare that the override is meant to completely
repeal the precedent, or it must amend every related statute that might be
construed in light of the precedent to make clear that the precedent no
154
See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The
Common Law in the Age of the New Public Law, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 875, 875 (1991) (“A
century ago, statutes were considered intrusions into the pristine order of the common law”);
Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 33–35 (1983).
155
The clear statement rule is a presumption, or canon, of statutory interpretation that
requires exceptional clarity in the text of a statute before the statute may be construed to
overcome an important background norm (e.g., federalism). For a comprehensive overview
of clear statement rules, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, QuasiConstitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev.
593 (1992).
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longer applies to that statute. By contrast, these same Justices have been
quite generous in their willingness to adopt sweeping judicial
overrulings of implementation-test precedents. In other words, the
Justices seem to have adopted a common-law-like stare decisis rule for
the judicial review of implementation test precedents, but a clearstatement-like rule for the judicial review of congressional overrides of
implementation-test precedents. Paradoxically, and notwithstanding
textualism’s oft-asserted claim to promoting judicial deference to
congressional choices,156 the upshot is that textualists are regularly
unwilling to give full effect to congressional overrides.
Consider an example involving the Civil Rights Act of 1991
(“CRA”), which overrode several earlier Supreme Court decisions
interpreting Title VII. One of the overridden cases was Lorance v. AT&T
Technologies,157 which involved a challenge to a seniority system
brought by a group of female employees. The seniority system had been
in place for several years, but a new round of layoffs based on the
system had occurred shortly before the plaintiffs filed their charge with
the EEOC.158 Title VII provides that in order to preserve eligibility to
file an employment-discrimination claim, an employee must file a
charge with the EEOC within 180 days “after the alleged unlawful
employment practice occurred.”159 The question presented was when
Title VII’s statute of limitations began to run and whether plaintiffs filed
their charge in a timely manner.160 A divided Court ruled that the statute
of limitations for challenging a seniority system begins to run when the
seniority system is first adopted, not when it is applied to disadvantage a
member of a protected class and that plaintiffs, accordingly, had not
filed their charge in a timely manner.161 This was a classic example of

156

See, e.g., Manning, supra note 16, at 103 (“By giving priority to semantic context
(when clear), textualism offers a more defensible account of legislative supremacy . . . .”);
Manning, supra note 18, at 18 (“The root of the textualist position is . . . in straightforward
faithful agent theory.”).
157
490 U.S. 900, 901–03 (1989).
158
See id. at 902.
159
Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 112, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)).
160
Lorance, 490 U.S. at 903.
161
Id. at 911–13.
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“implementation test” statutory interpretation, in that it established a rule
for administering the statute of limitations.
The CRA overrode Lorance by amending the general rule regarding
time limits to add that, with respect to seniority systems, “an unlawful
employment practice occurs . . . when the seniority system is adopted,
when an individual becomes subject to the seniority system, or when a
person aggrieved is injured by the application of the seniority
system . . . .”162 Despite this override, courts, including the Supreme
Court, have continued to apply Lorance as a “shadow precedent.”163
Most notoriously, in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, the Court’s
textualist and textualist-leaning Justices invoked Lorance to give an
exceedingly stingy reading to the 1991 CRA.164 Ledbetter involved a
claim of pay discrimination, rather than a challenge to a seniority
system, but its facts otherwise paralleled Lorance’s. Lilly Ledbetter
claimed that she had received poor employment evaluations because of
her sex and that the evaluations resulted in a rate of pay that was
substantially lower than the pay of men at the company with similar
experience and qualifications.165 The Supreme Court, in a 5–4 decision
that cited Lorance extensively, ruled that Ledbetter’s charge had not
been timely filed because most of the performance evaluations and pay
decisions about which she complained had been made several years
earlier, outside the 180-day charging period specified by Title VII.166
The majority opinion referenced the 1991 CRA override only in a
footnote, observing that “[a]fter Lorance, Congress amended Title VII to
cover the specific situation involved in that case.”167 It characterized the
override as applying “only” to seniority systems and argued that the
basic reasoning underlying the Lorance decision had not been called into
question.168
162
Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 112, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e))
(emphasis added).
163
See Widiss, Shadow Precedents, supra note 4.
164
550 U.S. 618, 620 (2007).
165
See id. at 621–22.
166
Id. at 623–29.
167
Id. at 627 n.2.
168
Id. A similar example involves the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (“PDA”),
which overrode the Supreme Court’s decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
125 (1976). See Widiss, Shadow Precedents, supra note 4, at 552–53. Gilbert addressed
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Justice Ginsburg and the other purposivist Justices dissented, arguing
that the override “superseded” the decision in Lorance and made it “no
longer effective.”169 The dissent insisted that the override demonstrated
Congress’s view that Lorance was “glaringly at odds with the purposes
of Title VII” and cited legislative history that showed that Congress
intended the override to eliminate reliance on both the reasoning and the
holding of Lorance.170 Congress quickly overrode the Court’s decision
with the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009.171

whether a disability policy that provided benefits to employees for all short-term disabilities
except pregnancy discriminated on the basis of sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 551. A majority of the Court reasoned that the plan did not
discriminate on the “basis” of “sex” because “sex” was not the explicit distinguishing factor.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 135. Rather, there were two groups of potential recipients of disability
benefits, “pregnant women and nonpregnant persons,” and although the “first group is
exclusively female, the second includes members of both sexes.” Id. (quoting Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496–97 n.20 (1974)). Because there was no class of disabilities for
which men were covered and women were not, the Court found there was no sex
discrimination. Id. at 139.
Congress quickly overrode Gilbert with the PDA. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076
(1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000)). The PDA added a definition of “sex” as
used in Title VII, providing that: “[t]he terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’
include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions.” § 1, 92 Stat. at 2076. The legislative history of the PDA made clear that
Congress intended for the override to “return” the law to what many believed it had meant
prior to the decision in Gilbert. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-948, at 2 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4750 (“It is the committee’s view that the dissenting Justices correctly
interpreted the Act.”); Widiss, Shadow Precedents, supra note 4, at 552. Yet in In re Union
Pacific Railroad Employment Practices Litigation, the Eighth Circuit, in an opinion authored
by a textualist-leaning judge, rejected plaintiffs’ claim that denial of insurance coverage for
contraceptives violates Title VII. 479 F.3d 936, 942–43 (8th Cir. 2007). The court construed
the language of the PDA narrowly, holding that contraceptives are not “related” to
pregnancy for purposes of analysis under the PDA. Id. at 942. It then performed a “separate”
sex discrimination analysis and held that there was no sex discrimination on the grounds that
Union Pacific’s plan denied coverage for both men and women and deemed the fact that
prescription coverage currently was available only for women irrelevant—the reasoning
from Gilbert that Congress rejected in the PDA. See id. at 943–45 & n.5.
169
Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 652 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
170
See id. at 652–53 (alteration in original) (quoting Sponsors’ Interpretative
Memorandum, 137 Cong. Rec. 29046, 29047 (1991)) (“This legislation should be interpreted
as disapproving the extension of [Lorance] to contexts outside of seniority systems.”).
171
Pub. L. No. 111–2, 123 Stat. 5 (Jan. 29, 2009) (codified in scattered sections of 29
U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
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Thus far, the literature on shadow precedents has treated continued
judicial reliance on overridden cases as a problematic but
understandable result of judicial confusion about the extent to which
Congress intends for an override to cancel out a prior precedent.172
Accordingly, proposals for reform have tended to suggest new, default
interpretive rules designed to give broad reach to legislative overrides.173
But the implementation-test exception identified in Part II.A suggests
another, more deliberate, explanation for the shadow precedent
phenomenon. Perhaps courts are not merely confused about the extent to
which an override has repudiated a prior precedent; perhaps they are
intentionally seeking to limit the effect of a legislative override of a
judicially crafted test because they believe that the judiciary, rather than
Congress, is best situated to make changes to such tests. In the case of
Ledbetter and Lorance, for example, perhaps the textualist Justices
viewed Lorance’s implementation rule—that a discriminatory practice
must be challenged when it occurs rather than when its effects are felt—
as a common-law-like rule that courts should update based on their lived
experiences with the rule. Although they recognized that the legislature
formally has the power to override the rule, they may have viewed the
override skeptically, as an intrusion by the legislative branch into a
function—implementation—that belongs to the judiciary. Accordingly,
they may have felt bound to give effect to the override only to the extent
that it clearly repudiated the precedent. Put differently, the Justices in
the Ledbetter majority may have viewed questions about when a statute
of limitations should begin to run as “judicial administration” questions
that courts are better equipped than legislatures to answer and may,
accordingly, have viewed Congress’s override as a legislative intrusion
whose reach they were justified in limiting.174
172

See, e.g., Widiss, Shadow Precedents, supra note 4, at 514–15; Widiss, Undermining
Overrides, supra note 4, at 860–61, 933.
173
See Widiss, Shadow Precedents, supra note 4, at 566–75 (proposing a “rebuttable
presumption” that congressional overrides signal a need for “fresh” statutory analysis);
Widiss, Undermining Overrides, supra note 4, at 933–41 (emphasis omitted) (suggesting that
the Court provide “fresh” statutory analysis “consistent with the meaning Congress signaled
it ascribes to the relevant language”).
174
For instance, textualists may have believed the Lorance rule was necessary to keep
judicial dockets manageable—or at least that the judiciary, rather than the legislature, is bestsituated to make such determinations.

COPYRIGHT © 2018 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2018]

Textualism and Statutory Precedents

201

Of course, the Ledbetter decision also seems to have been motivated,
in part, by ideological concerns: the Justices who gave the 1991 CRA a
narrow reading were also the Court’s most conservative Justices,
ideologically indisposed to favor Title VII claims. This Article does not
intend to suggest that ideology is not at work in such cases; rather, it
aims to show that there may be jurisprudential reasons, in addition to
ideology, that help explain the Justices’ “shadow” reliance on precedents
such as Lorance.175
Specifically, the Court, or its textualist-leaning Justices, may be
holding congressional revisions to judicially created implementation
tests to a clear-statement standard that they do not apply to judicial
revisions of the Court’s own common-law-style tests for implementing a
statute. In other words, the textualist Justices may view it as part of the
Court’s role to reconsider its own implementation tests based on
practical experiences with the test, but they may view it as suspect—and
an occasion for a limiting judicial check-and-balance—when the
impetus for changes to an implementation test comes from Congress, as
a corrective of a judicial decision. Moreover, these Justices may believe
that a different standard of review should apply when they are reviewing
the new statutory text of a congressional override (a clear-statement
rule) than when they are revisiting a judicial interpretation of a statute
(common-law standard of review).
Purposivist jurists, by contrast, generally have been willing to give
broad effect to congressional overrides of statutory precedents that adopt
implementation tests—as Justice Ginsburg’s Ledbetter dissent
illustrates. One reason for this may be that, as noted earlier,176
purposivists are more focused on legislative intent than are their
textualist colleagues—and thus are more willing to take their cues from
Congress when evaluating the scope and meaning of an override. For
example, purposivist jurists are, as a matter of methodological
preference, far more willing to give effect to materials in the legislative
record that demonstrate congressional intent for an override to apply
broadly or indicate that Congress thought the Court’s original
175

See supra notes 115–120 and accompanying text for more on why ideology does not fully
explain textualist Justices’ willingness to abandon statutory stare decisis.
176
See discussion supra Part II.
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interpretation erroneous and meant for the override to completely
repudiate the precedent. These are all facets of the “faithful agent”
versus “monitoring” role that divides purposivists and textualists:
purposivists view it as their role to fulfill Congress’s design, which
entails giving full effect to Congress’s overrides of the Court’s own
statutory interpretations, while textualists view it as the Court’s role to
monitor rules of the Court’s own making, including common-law-like
tests for implementing statutes. Moreover, textualists seem to view
Congress as a poor judge of the effectiveness of judicially crafted
implementation tests, and Congress’s power to interfere with such tests
as limited only to direct changes Congress makes to the text of the
relevant statutes.
C. Textualism’s Psychology
In addition to the implementation-test distinction, two other factors
appear to contribute to textualist Justices’ readiness to overrule statutory
precedents. First, textualist Justices appear prone to a “correct answer”
mindset, such that their jurisprudential commitment to precision and
belief in a single correct statutory meaning may make it especially
difficult for them to follow a precedent they view as inaccurate. Second,
at least some of the textualist Justices seem to see themselves as
jurisprudential revolutionaries, whose function is to overthrow the old,
corrupt, judicial order—including statutory precedents arrived at through
the use of improper interpretive tools such as legislative history. This
Section explores each of these factors in turn.
1. A “Correct Answer” Mindset
At its core, textualism is a method of statutory interpretation that aims
to identify the plain meaning of a statute’s text—that is, the simple,
basic, obvious meaning.177 It is founded on a belief that most statutes
have an easily identifiable meaning,178 and there is some evidence that
177

See, e.g., Webster’s New World Dictionary 570 (David B. Guralnik ed., 2d Concise ed.
1982) (listing third meaning for the word “plain” as “clearly understood; evident; obvious”
and sixth meaning as “not complicated; simple”).
178
See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1,
39 & n.169 (2006) (citing Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative

COPYRIGHT © 2018 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2018]

Textualism and Statutory Precedents

203

textualist judges tend to find a plain meaning more often than do other
jurists.179 Textualist judges, particularly in the post-Scalia era, tend to
presume that there is a correct, definitive answer to every (or nearly
every) interpretive question and to treat the task of statutory
interpretation like a puzzle.180 If the correct answer cannot be found
through a plain reading of the text, then the dictionary, Latin maxims,
other sections of the statute, and even the Court’s interpretations of other
statutes using similar language should be consulted to decipher the
statute’s meaning. Such bounded interpretive aids are trusted to lead the
Court to the correct construction. As Justice Scalia and co-author
Professor Bryan Garner put it in a book designed to serve as a textualist
primer on statutory interpretation, “[M]ost interpretive questions have a
right answer. Variability in interpretation is a distemper.”181
This Article suggests that textualism’s relentless focus on identifying
the “correct” statutory meaning may have an under-appreciated side
effect for its proponents. That is, textualists’ “correct meaning”
emphasis may make it especially difficult for them to follow a precedent
that they believe gets the answer to the interpretive puzzle wrong. In
other words, something about the textualist approach—what we can

Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L.J. 511, 521) (“Some interpreters have great confidence
in the determinacy of law and tend to view their initial reading of a text as the single, correct
reading.”).
179
See, e.g., Bradford C. Mank, Is a Textualist Approach to Statutory Interpretation ProEnvironmentalist?: Why Pragmatic Agency Decisionmaking is Better than Judicial
Literalism, 53 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1231, 1266, 1275 & n.235 (1996) (explaining that
textualists rarely believe they must defer to agency interpretations because they usually find
clear meaning in the text); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative
Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L.J. 511, 521 (acknowledging that he “finds more
often . . . that the meaning of a statute is apparent from its text and from its relationship with
other laws.”). See also Krishnakumar, supra note 18, at 849 (demonstrating that most
textualist Justices invoked plain meaning at higher rates than non-textualist Justices during
the Roberts Court’s first 6.5 terms).
180
See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 Wash.
U. L.Q. 351, 354, 372 (1994) (describing how textualists’ puzzle-solving approach often
results in answers); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court’s New Hypertextualism: An
Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 Colum. L. Rev.
749, 779 (1995) (comparing the textualist interpretive process to solving a puzzle); see also
Mank, supra note 179, at 1257 (noting textualists’ conviction and certainty about their
method).
181
Scalia & Garner, supra note 6, at 6.
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perhaps call the “correct answer” mindset—may make it particularly
painful for textualist Justices to accept an incorrect statutory
construction simply because it was first in time.182 As a result, the
famous tenet that “in most matters it is more important that the
applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right”183 may
prove challenging for textualists to adhere to in practice.
In arguing that textualists are prone to a “correct answer” mindset, I
do not mean to suggest that purposivist and pragmatist jurists do not also
seek the “best” or “correct” reading of a statute. Identifying the “best”
statutory construction is a goal shared by every interpretive approach.
But different interpretive theories define “best answer” in different
ways. Whereas textualists tend to argue that there is one correct way to
read a statute, purposivists and pragmatists tend to acknowledge that
there is often more than one fair way to construe a statute and that their
preferred construction is “best” in light of Congress’s purpose or in light
of the practical consequences it will produce. Jurists who subscribe to
purposivist or pragmatic interpretive theories do not argue that the
construction they advance is the only plausible one, that there is only
one valid way to read the statute, or that other readings are illegitimate.
Textualist jurists, by contrast, regularly make such claims—for example,
arguing that the statute’s text is “dispositive”;184 calling opposing
constructions of the statute “sheer applesauce”;185 and using dictionary
definitions to insist that the term at issue cannot mean what an opposing

182
It is also, of course, possible that an individual judge’s predisposition to a “correct
answer” mindset may be what attracts the judge to textualism as an interpretive approach. It
is hard to say which comes first, textualism or a “correct answer” mindset. In hypothesizing
about the reasons that underlie textualist jurists’ relaxed approach to statutory stare decisis, I
do not mean to imply that textualism causes any particular kind of thinking, rather than the
other way around. This Article’s intent is merely to note a correlation between textualism
and a “correct answer” mindset. Thanks to Professor Maggie Lemos for pressing me to
clarify this.
183
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
184
See, e.g., CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 464 (2008) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 340 (2002).
185
Zuni Pub. Sch. District No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 113 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). See also King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2501 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“[p]ure applesauce”).
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opinion construes it to mean.186 This textualist disdain for interpretations
that do not square with dictionary definitions—or that are identified
through the use of “improper” interpretive aids, such as purpose or
legislative history—may in turn make it more difficult for textualists to
accept statutory precedents that they believe “get it wrong,” even in the
name of stability and continuity.187
A significant literature has recognized the impact of textualists’
“correct answer” mindset in the context of judicial review of agency
statutory interpretations—arguing that textualist judges are more likely
to refuse to defer to agency interpretations. Specifically, scholars have
argued that textualism is more likely than other interpretive approaches
to lead judges to find that a statute has a “plain meaning” and,
accordingly, to deny deference to an administrative agency’s contrary
construction of the statute.188 As Professor Thomas Merrill has argued,
“Textualism . . . tends to make statutory interpretation an exercise in
ingenuity—an attitude that may be less conducive to deference to the
decisions of other institutions than the dry archival approach associated
with intentionalism.”189
A similar effect appears to be at work with textualism and statutory
stare decisis—except that in this context textualists often deny deference
to the interpretations made by predecessor courts, rather than
administrative agencies. Recall, for example, that in CBOCS West, Inc.
186

See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 731–33 (2006) (alteration in original)
(citations omitted) (reasoning that the term “waters of the United States” cannot include dry
channels through which water occasionally flows because the dictionary defines “water” as
“streams and bodies forming geographical features such as oceans, rivers, [and] lakes,” or
“flowing or moving masses”); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225
(1994) (citations omitted) (holding that a statute authorizing an agency “to modify” rates
does not confer power to make fundamental changes because “[v]irtually every dictionary
we are aware of says that ‘to modify’ means to change moderately or in minor fashion”).
187
See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 670–73 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (calling majority’s defense of precedent based on congressional inaction a
“canard”).
188
See Michael Herz, Judicial Textualism Meets Congressional Micromanagement: A
Potential Collision in Clean Air Act Interpretation, 16 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 175, 198–99
(1992) (“Confidence in statutory meaning is likely to keep a textualist judge in Chevron’s
nondeferential step one.”); Merrill, supra note 180, at 357–58 (discussing the impact of
textualism on Chevron deference); Pierce, supra note 180, at 752 (discussing the Court’s
extreme use of textualism to the exclusion of other factors).
189
Merrill, supra note 180, at 354 (emphasis added).
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v. Humphries, discussed in Part I.B, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice
Scalia, insisted that the precedent at issue did not interpret Section 1982
to support a retaliation claim, but that even if it did, the precedent should
be rejected because it incorrectly construed the statute’s text.190
Similarly, Justice Thomas’s dissent in Preston v. Ferrer, listed in
Appendix I, argued that the precedent at issue in that case should be
overruled because it was simply wrong, both as a matter of text and
context, to hold that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) applies to state
courts.191 This type of “the precedent is just plain wrong!” argument
features prominently in a number of other cases listed in Appendix I.192
The “correct answer” mindset also may play a role in textualists’
eagerness to overrule precedents based on discredited economic
theories. That is, textualists’ call to overrule in such cases may not be so
much about updating the statute to reflect modern understandings—a
distinctly purposivist or pragmatic goal that seems oddly incongruous
with textualism—as much as about the scholarly consensus that the
economic theory supporting the precedent is flawed. That is, textualists’
“correct answer” mindset may translate into a powerful urge to correct
interpretations based on a now-refuted economic theory, so that an entire
line of legal doctrine does not continue to rest on a false foundation.
Whereas jurists who subscribe to other interpretive theories may be
willing to wait for Congress to update the law when new economic
understandings or data prove an original judicial interpretation wrong,
textualists may find it more offensive to leave a clearly recognized error
190

553 U.S. 442, 464–70 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
552 U.S. 346, 363 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing prior cases that analyzed
contemporary case law and other provisions of the FAA).
192
See Altria Grp., v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 92, 95–96, 106–07 (2008) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the “plurality’s atextual approach” because “the text speaks for
itself”); Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 260–61 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted) (asserting that the precedent engaged in an “amazing display of
interpretive gymnastics” and was “a patently ‘revisionist construction of the Act’”); Clark v.
Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 402–03 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the precedent
interpretation is “untenable” and “[t]he mere fact that Congress can overturn our cases by
statute is no excuse for failing to overrule a statutory precedent of ours that is clearly
wrong”); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 892, 945 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment) (calling precedent “at odds with the terms of the statute” and “based on a flawed
method of statutory construction”); Johnson, 480 U.S. at 670–73 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“Weber rewrote the statute it purported to construe.”); infra Appendix I.
191
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on the books—and in a position to distort future interpretations. In a
sense, then, scholarly consensus may substitute for clear statutory text in
these cases and textualists may be unwilling to accept a precedent that
contradicts such consensus in much the same way that they have
difficulty with precedents that contradict the statute’s text. As Justice
Thomas put it in his concurring opinion in Halliburton, “Principles of
stare decisis do not compel us to save Basic’s muddled logic and
armchair economics.”193
As Appendix I and the case examples in Part I demonstrate, the
Court’s two most committed textualists, Justices Thomas and Scalia,
appear to be most fond of this type of “the precedent is just plain
wrong!” argument. Justice Thomas in particular seems to have difficulty
reconciling the “correct answer” mindset with the doctrine of statutory
stare decisis. He has regularly authored opinions that advocate
overruling precedents because they are “just plain wrong!”194—and this
argument has featured prominently in the cases in which he alone has
voted to overturn.195 This is in part because Justice Thomas is a bit of a
revolutionary with respect to judicial methodology, as discussed further
in the next Section.196 Justice Scalia, too, advocated overturning
precedents on the ground that they were erroneous—although less often
and less consistently than Justice Thomas.197 Notably, Justice Scalia
193
Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2425 (2014) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
194
See supra note 192. In fact, Justice Thomas criticized a precedent’s textual analysis in
eleven of the thirteen precedent-challenging opinions in Appendix I that he authored.
195
See Gonzalez, 553 U.S. at 260–61 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Preston, 552 U.S. at 363
(Thomas, J., dissenting); Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 114–15 (2007) (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
196
See infra Part II.C.2. Justice Thomas is also unusually willing to overrule constitutional
precedents if the original opinion was not based on an originalist methodology. See Jeffrey
Rosen, Originalism, Precedent, and Judicial Restraint, 34 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 129, 130
(2011) (“According to Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas would overrule any precedent that is
inconsistent with the Constitution’s original meaning.”). But this view is at least consistent
with the rule that constitutional precedents are entitled to a relaxed form of stare decisis—a
result of the difficulty legislators face in amending the Constitution, which has made the
Court the de facto actor capable of correcting mistakes of constitutional interpretation. By
contrast, Justice Thomas’s readiness to overrule statutory precedents based on inaccuracy
cuts against the longstanding statutory stare decisis rule.
197
Justice Scalia joined four of the opinions Justice Thomas authored that made a “the
precedent is just plain wrong!” argument and joined two of three opinions advocating
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sometimes voted to follow statutory stare decisis despite his strong
belief that the precedent was wrongly decided—including in cases in
which he had dissented from the opinion that established the
precedent.198 Justice Scalia thus seemed to strike more of a balance
between “getting it right” and adhering to statutory stare decisis than
does Justice Thomas.199 The other textualist or textualist-leaning
Justices, by contrast, only rarely joined an opinion citing the
erroneousness of a prior Court’s statutory analysis as a justification for
overturning a statutory precedent.200
2. Textualism as Revolution
Textualist jurists’ readiness to overturn statutory precedents may also
be explained, in part, by the fact that the most committed among them

overruling based on an evolving economic theory. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S.
167, 178–79 (2009) (arguing that the Court’s precedent is plainly wrong); CBOCS West,
Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 469–70 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (same); Altria, 555
U.S. at 106 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (same); Holder, 512 U.S. at 945 (Thomas, J., concurring
in the judgment) (same); Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2417–27 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment) (espousing an evolving economic theory); Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v.
PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889–92 (2007) (same). Scalia also authored one opinion himself
arguing that a precedent should be overturned because it was simply incorrect. See Johnson,
480 U.S. at 672–73 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
198
See, e.g., Preston, 552 U.S. at 353. Scalia joined the majority opinion despite
previously expressing disagreement with the same construction in an earlier case, Allied–
Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 284–97 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 114–16. Scalia also joined the majority opinion here to uphold
Booker despite the fact that he originally dissented in that case.
199
Indeed, Justice Scalia wrote about the importance of stare decisis in preserving stability
and argued that it usually should apply even when a prior decision misinterprets the statute’s
text. See Scalia & Garner, supra note 6, at 272, 331 (acknowledging that it is not appropriate
“to overrule all cases previously ignoring or distorting the statute” because “stare decisis
suffices to preserve them.”).
200
See Altria, 555 U.S. at 92, 95–96, 106–07 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (Justices Roberts,
Scalia, Alito joining); Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 402–03 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (Justice Rehnquist joining). See also infra Appendix I (listing additional cases
critiquing the Court’s previous statutory analysis). These other textualist-leaning Justices
were more willing to vote to overturn statutory precedents based on evolving economic
theories than they were to overrule based on perceived errors in the original opinion’s
statutory analysis. See Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2415 (Alito, J., dissenting); Halliburton, 134 S.
Ct. at 2417–27 (2014) (Thomas, Scalia & Alito, JJ., concurring in the judgment); Leegin,
551 U.S. at 887–88 (Kennedy, Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., majority opinion).
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see themselves as revolutionaries seeking to reinvent the judiciary’s
approach to interpreting statutes.201 Many served as legal advisors to
Republican presidents prior to joining the bench: some played key roles
in selecting and vetting judicial nominees who could be counted on to
follow specific jurisprudential approaches, including textualism.202 As
judges themselves, they now are on a mission to reshape the way that
courts construe both the Constitution and statutes—championing an
originalist approach to constitutional interpretation and a textualist
approach to statutory interpretation.
Given their revolutionary mission, these jurists are perfectly willing to
overrule past precedents that, in their view, were decided using
interpretive methods they consider illegitimate and that they took office
intending to overthrow. In other words, rejecting old precedents does not
bother these textualist revolutionaries because it is part and parcel of
their agenda to depose the old jurisprudential regime.
While some state courts appear to be comprised of a solid bloc of
jurists who fit this “revolutionary” bill, the Justices on the U.S. Supreme
Court fall along a spectrum in their commitment to a textualist
revolution. At one end of the spectrum is Justice Thomas who regularly
calls for overruling statutory (and constitutional) precedents.203 Justice
Scalia is next, followed by Justice Alito, Justice Roberts, and then
Justice Kennedy—as Appendix I illustrates.204
201

Thanks to Bill Eskridge for this insight.
See Stephen J. Markman, On Interpretation and Non-Interpretation, 3 Benchmark 219,
219 (1987); Current Members, Supreme Court of the United States,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Oct. 23, 2017);
Biography of Former Associate Justice Antonin Scalia, https://www.supremecourt.gov
/about/biographyScalia.aspx (last visited Oct. 23, 2017) [hereinafter Biography of Scalia];
Goldman, supra note 113 (describing Michigan Supreme Court Justice Markman’s role in
the “Reagan Revolution”) and accompanying text; infra note 210.
203
As Appendix I shows, Justice Thomas joined thirteen of seventeen Roberts Court
opinions advocating overruling a statutory precedent (and authored ten of them). If we
include Rehnquist Court opinions, he joined seventeen of twenty-four opinions calling for
overruling a statutory precedent between 1992–2015 and authored thirteen of them. See infra
Appendix I.
204
Justice Scalia joined sixteen of twenty-nine opinions in cases calling for overruling a
statutory precedent during the years he served on the Court (1986–2015) and authored five
of them. Justice Alito joined eight of seventeen opinions calling for overruling a statutory
precedent during his tenure (2006–2015) and authored three of them. Justice Roberts joined
five of eighteen opinions calling for overruling a statutory precedent during his tenure
202
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It should not come as a surprise that Scalia and Thomas are the
Justices most committed to a textualist interpretive methodology. Justice
Scalia served in the Office of Legal Counsel under President Ford205 and
had a long history in politics and in his scholarly and judicial writings of
seeking to revolutionize how courts interpret statutes.206 Justice
Thomas’s calls for revolution have largely been confined to his judicial
opinions but he has been equally, if more quietly, as committed as
Justice Scalia to the textualist interpretive approach. Justice Alito’s
inclusion in this group of willing “overrulers” is more unexpected and
likely has more to do with the implementation-test exception discussed
in Section A than with a revolutionary textualist zeal.207 Chief Justice
Roberts, perhaps because of his role as Chief Justice, has shown himself
to be much more concerned with institutional preservation than with
revolution or with textualism. Indeed, as scholars have chronicled, he
has shied away from bold moves that might appear politically or
ideologically motivated—voting to uphold the Affordable Care Act and
employing an incremental, almost “stealth” path to overrule Miranda,
(2005–2015) and authored none of them. Justice Kennedy joined six of twenty-six opinions
that called for overruling a statutory precedent during his tenure (1988–2015) and authored
two of them. See id.
205
See Biography of Scalia, supra note 202.
206
See, e.g., Scalia & Garner, supra note 6, at xxix, 6; Scalia, supra note 19, at 3, 17; Zuni
Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 108–22 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 97–100 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgement).
207
While Justice Alito is certainly a textualist, he differs from Justices Thomas and Scalia
in that he is not committed to rejecting legislative history as an interpretive aid—on the
contrary, he has proved willing to consult the statute’s legislative history in several cases.
See, e.g., B & B Hardware v. Hargis Indus., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1310 (2015); Kellogg Brown &
Root Servs. v. United States ex rel. Carter, 135 S. Ct. 1970, 1973, 1977–78 (2015);
Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2302 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting); Taniguchi v.
Kan. Pac. Saipan, 566 U.S. 560, 569–70 n.4 (2012); Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 577 &
nn.9–10 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting); Global-Tech Appliances v. SEB, 563 U.S. 754, 761
(2011); Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 565–67, 581–82 (2011) (Alito, J.,
concurring); Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 515–17 (2011) (Alito, J., concurring in
part, concurring in the judgment, dissenting in part); Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196,
222–23 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting); Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438, 470–72 (2010)
(Alito, J., dissenting); Jones v. Harris Assocs., 559 U.S. 335, 339, 343 n.3 (2010); Corley v.
United States, 556 U.S. 303, 329 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting); Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v.
Chertoff, 553 U.S. 571, 583–85 (2008); Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 501–02
(2006).

COPYRIGHT © 2018 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2018]

Textualism and Statutory Precedents

211

the Voting Rights Act, and other precedents.208 And Justice Kennedy,
often referred to as the “swing” vote on the Roberts Court,209 is easily
the least revolutionary of all the Justices in his ideological and
methodological commitment to textualism—as well as in his career
before joining the bench.210
A 2015 case, Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association,211 nicely
illustrates the Justices’ varying positions on the “revolutionariness”
scale. Perez involved a D.C. Circuit decision that imposed a new
requirement on administrative agencies: forcing them to engage in
notice and comment before substantially changing an existing
interpretation of their own regulations.212 All of the Justices agreed that
the D.C. Circuit’s new rule was inconsistent with the Administrative

208

See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
that taxpayers purchasing insurance on an Exchange established by the Secretary of Health
and Human Services are not entitled to tax credits under the Affordable Care Act because the
federal exchange has not been set up “by the State”); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,
567 U.S. 519, 588 (2012) (holding that the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate is
constitutional under Congress’s taxation power); Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370,
381–89 (2010) (requiring a suspect who has been informed he has a right to remain silent to
make an unambiguous statement invoking the right in order to take advantage of it); Florida
v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 59–64 (2010) (noting that while an individual has the right to consult
with a lawyer and to have a lawyer present during interrogation, the latter right at least need
not be explicitly conveyed to the individual); Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 103–16
(2010) (holding that releasing an individual back to the general prison population constitutes
a break in custody that ends the presumption of involuntariness in waiving Miranda rights);
Northwest Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 207–11 (2009)
(permitting all political subdivisions of states to seek bailout from the preclearance
requirements of the Voting Rights Act). See also Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth
Overruling (With Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 Geo. L.J. 1, 3 (2010)
(describing how the Roberts Court “overrul[ed] sub silentio what [it] would not overturn
explicitly”).
209
See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Justice’s Tolerance Toward Gays Is Seen in Sacramento
Roots, N.Y. Times, June 22, 2015, at A10.
210
Whereas Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito, like Justice Scalia, all
served in high-level positions during the Reagan, Bush, or Ford administrations, often
providing legal advice about the meaning of the Constitution or federal statutes, Justice
Kennedy spent most of his pre-judicial career in private practice and academia. See
Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, supra note 202; Biography of Scalia,
supra note 202.
211
135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015).
212
Id. at 1206.
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Procedure Act (“APA”) and voted to reverse.213 Justices Thomas and
Scalia would have gone further, however, to overrule a well-established
precedent, Auer v. Robbins, which held that courts must defer to
administrative agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations.214
Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Perez argued both that Auer was
incompatible with the APA’s text and that it created a practical
conundrum—too much deference to agency interpretations of agency
regulations—that prompted the D.C. Circuit’s misguided rule.215
Justice Alito, on the other hand, was not willing to reach down and
overrule Auer—yet—and so authored a concurring opinion that
expressed sympathy for Justices Scalia’s and Thomas’s views and
signaled his willingness to reconsider Auer in a future case.216 Justices
Roberts and Kennedy joined the majority opinion with no mention of
overruling Auer.
As Perez illustrates, Justices Thomas and Scalia see themselves as
leaders in a quest to rid the legal system of textually incorrect,
outmoded, and practically problematic statutory interpretations. They
were willing, therefore, to strike down a precedent that was not even
squarely before the Court. Justice Alito is more cautious. Though he
seemed inclined to agree with Justices Thomas and Scalia on the merits
of overruling Auer, he was willing to wait for a more opportune
moment. Justices Roberts and Kennedy are far more “precedentially
correct” in their approaches, staying silent because there was no need to
discuss the merits of Auer in this case.
Ultimately, the “correct answer” mindset and a commitment to
revolutionize statutory interpretation probably apply most, or have the
most explanatory value, for Justices Thomas’s and Scalia’s treatment of
statutory precedents. The implementation-test exception, by contrast,
cuts across all the textualist and textualist-leaning Justices and seems to
be a factor in a majority of the cases in which these Justices advocate
overruling a statutory precedent. Indeed, it is worth reiterating that over
half the cases listed in Appendix I (seventeen of thirty-one (54.8%))

213

Id.
519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
215
Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1211–12 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
216
Id. at 1210–11 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
214
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involved implementation-test precedents.217 Of the remaining fourteen
cases, seven contained an argument that the precedent in question
conflicted with the statute’s plain text; all but one of these was authored
by Justice Thomas or Justice Scalia.218
III. IMPLICATIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS
Having demonstrated that textualists are more willing to overrule
statutory precedents on the grounds that implementation tests are not
real statutory interpretation or because the “correct answer” mindset
makes them loathe to perpetuate a mistake, it is worth examining
whether they have a point. This Part turns from the theoretical to the
normative, evaluating the desirability of textualist Justices’ relaxed
approach to statutory stare decisis. It argues that if we view judicially
created tests for implementing statutes as analogues to agency statutory
implementation, then it makes sense to allow judicial updating of such
tests. This is especially true where an implementation test precedent has
proved unworkable in practice and the alternative is to wait for Congress
to notice the problem and muster the political will to fix it.
At the same time, however, this Article takes issue with the “correct
answer” mindset justification, arguing that statutory precedents should
not be overruled simply because a later Court believes an earlier Court
“got the interpretation wrong.” It also criticizes textualist Justices’
readiness to abandon statutory stare decisis for closely related statutes
that have a long history of being interpreted similarly and disapproves of
textualists’ stingy construction of congressional overrides and continued
reliance on “shadow precedents”—which amounts to a rigid adherence
to statutory stare decisis in the face of legislative action disapproving the
217

See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
See CBOCS West, Inc., 553 U.S. at 469 & n.5 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting);
Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 260–61 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Preston,
552 U.S. 346, 363 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 401–02
(2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting); BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 187–89 (2004)
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 716
(1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Johnson v. Transp.
Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 675–76 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); infra Appendix I. Overall,
more than three-fourths (twenty-four of thirty-one (77.4%)) of the cases listed in Appendix I
involved either an implementation test or an argument that the precedent in question
conflicted with the statute’s plain text.
218
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precedent. Section A makes the case that judicial interpretations of
statutes that establish implementation tests have a great deal in common
with agencies’ implementing regulations and should similarly be
susceptible to updating and correction if they should prove problematic.
Section B advocates that courts apply the ordinary form of stare decisis
used for common-law precedents to implementation test precedents, but
with a congressional-approval caveat. The section also examines how
several of the cases described in Part I would fare under such an
approach.
A. The Agency Analogue
In one sense, when courts interpret statutes—and particularly when
they create tests for implementing a statute—they are engaging in a gapfilling enterprise similar to that which administrative agencies perform
when they promulgate rules, issue orders, or adopt policies designed to
execute Congress’s statutory directives.219 As Professor Margaret Lemos
has highlighted, many federal statutes openly delegate decision-making
authority to federal courts through the deliberate use of vague or openended statutory language.220 Among the statutes Lemos highlights as
examples are a number that were at issue in the cases discussed in Part
I.221 In the context of administrative agencies, it is well established that
regulations, orders, and policies adopted pursuant to legislatively
delegated authority are not set in stone and that agencies are free to later
update their interpretations and implementation rules to reflect new
factual or legal developments, practical realities, or their own evolving
policy judgments.222 This analogue suggests that statutory stare decisis

219
See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s Choice of Delegate:
Judicial and Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 363, 370–72 (2010).
220
Id. at 370–71.
221
Id. (discussing the Sherman Act, Title VII, the Securities Act of 1934, the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act, the Copyright Act, and the Labor Management Relations
Act).
222
See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. 502, 514–15 (2009). See also Chevron
U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 863–64 (1984) (“An initial agency
interpretation is not instantly carved in stone. On the contrary, the agency, to engage in
informed rulemaking, must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on
a continuing basis.”).
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similarly should be relaxed for judicial interpretations that amount to
gap-filling exercises—that is, for interpretations that involve significant
judicial policymaking rather than merely “say what the law is.” The
classic case would include judicial interpretations that create
implementation tests.
There is an obvious counter to this analogue—namely, that unlike
administrative agencies, courts are not policymaking institutions. Rather,
courts are supposed to be neutral arbiters of the law. If we treat their
statutory interpretations the way we treat agency interpretations—
allowing them to change implementation tests based on societal
developments like evolving economic theories or on their own judgment
that a previously announced rule is producing undesirable
consequences—courts will begin to look a lot like policymakers. That,
in turn, could cause legitimacy problems for the Court and is the kind of
judicial discretion-broadening practice that textualists themselves
ordinarily object to.
Having set forth this counter to the agency–court analogue, I want to
resist it—at least to a certain extent. There are several reasons to
question the courts-are-not-policymakers argument in this context. First,
there is some merit to the textualist-leaning Justices’ argument that when
the Court crafts an implementation test, the initial judicial interpretation
itself amounts to an act of policymaking. That is, the Court is not merely
deciding what “X” statutory term or phrase means; instead, it is crafting
a rubric for applying the statute in the future—much as common-law
courts craft standards or multi-factor inquiries for evaluating commonlaw claims in future cases. Given this, it is something of a facade to
insulate judicially created implementation tests from later revision,
based on the argument that courts should not engage in judicial
policymaking. Rather, as textualists and their sympathizers have
suggested, perhaps we should be honest about calling an act of
policymaking an act of policymaking and should permit judicial
correction of judicially created policies if and when those policies prove
unworkable.
Further, legitimacy concerns should be diminished when the Court
overturns an implementation test versus when it overturns a more
straightforward “X term means Y” interpretation. As I have observed
elsewhere, it should be easier, and involve less embarrassing backpedaling, for the Supreme Court to overturn its own rules for
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implementing a statute than for it to overturn its previous conclusions
about what a statutory phrase or word means.223 That is, it should be
more acceptable, politically and institutionally, for the Court to declare
that, “The test we created for implementing this statute is proving
unworkable for lower courts to apply, so it is time that we step in and fix
it,” than it is for the Court to state, “We changed our mind. The statute
does not really mean what we previously said it means.”224
Second, rethinking statutory stare decisis for implementation test
precedents does not have to be an all-or-nothing endeavor. There may be
a middle ground between treating implementation test precedents like
agency interpretations and entrenching them against all change. While it
is true that courts serve a different institutional function than do
administrative agencies, it also is true that when the Supreme Court
updates an implementation test to address lower-court confusion or other
test-administration problems, the Court may be viewed as engaging in a
permissible form of policymaking—that is, supervising or acting as an
administrator of the judicial system. Indeed, in such cases, the Supreme
Court, like administrative agencies who have close connections and
feedback loops with the industries they regulate,225 is more likely to be
in touch with how lower courts are faring under an implementation test
than are members of Congress. This is in part because the Supreme
Court is more connected to lower courts through professional
interactions, publications highlighting trends in judicial decisions, and
contacts with litigants and attorneys than is Congress. It is also because,
as the ultimate supervisor of the judicial system, the Supreme Court is in
a better position to receive complaints about an implementation test
from other members of the legal profession than is Congress. Although
attorneys might lobby Congress seeking changes in the law, it is difficult
to imagine lower court judges complaining to Congress about an
implementation test they find difficult to administer. By contrast, lower
court judges do write articles criticizing Supreme Court precedents and
pen lengthy criticisms of such precedents in their own judicial
223

Krishnakumar, supra note 142, at 1491–92.
See generally id. at 1492.
225
See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 San Diego L. Rev. 61,
70 (2006) (detailing ways members of Congress informally supervise and provide feedback
to agencies).
224
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opinions—and litigants seeking to convince the Court to abandon an
implementation test have significant incentives and opportunities to
bring such criticisms to the Court’s attention.
In addition, it seems more appropriate, institutionally, for the Court
rather than Congress to correct an implementation test that is not
working. Even if Congress is made aware that lower courts have
criticized a precedent or have had trouble implementing it, Congress is
simply less likely to reverse the precedent than is the Court. As political
scientists and legal scholars have long recognized, the legislative process
is filled with numerous “negative legislative checkpoints” or “veto
gates”—e.g., committee jurisdiction, filibusters, bicameralism,
conference committees, presentment—that prevent the majority of
legislative proposals from becoming law.226 Moreover, the legislative
agenda is crowded, and Congress may be more committed to addressing
other agenda items even if it is made aware of lower court dissatisfaction
with a Supreme Court implementation test. Indeed, depending on the
political saliency of the implementation test precedent, Congress may
have very little motivation to override the test—because the issue is not
important enough to its members or to interest groups who have clout
with its members or, conversely, because the issue is too controversial
and its members cannot agree on how to fix the test. Relatedly, Congress
may be less motivated to spend its limited time and resources enacting
administrative fixes to judicial tests than it is to address other kinds of
publicly visible issues. Indeed, it may view the supervision of
implementation tests as a mere housekeeping matter, low on its list of
priorities.
B. Ordinary Stare Decisis for Implementation Tests
Given the above, it may make sense for courts to apply a relaxed form
of stare decisis to statutory interpretation precedents that involve an
implementation test—and to correct such tests judicially when they turn
out to be problematic. This Article argues that courts should apply to
implementation test precedents the ordinary form of stare decisis that
226

See, e.g., McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory
Interpretation, 80 Geo. L.J. 705, 7219–22 (1992); Maxwell L. Stearns, The Public Choice
Case Against the Item Veto, 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 385, 398, 408 (1992).
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they currently apply to common law precedents—that is, an ordinary
presumption of correctness.
Here is how this could work: the U.S. Supreme Court already has
articulated a list of “prudential and pragmatic” factors that justify
overruling a non-statutory judicial precedent. The Court articulated these
factors in a case, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey,227 that involved a constitutional rather than a common-law
precedent, but the factors nevertheless provide a useful guide for
gauging when it is appropriate to overrule an ordinary precedent. The
factors the Court has articulated permit judicial overruling when
(1) The precedent “has proven to be intolerable simply in defying
practical workability;”
(2) The precedent has not created reliance interests “that would lend a
special hardship to the consequences of overruling;”
(3) “[R]elated principles of law have so far developed as to have left
the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine”; or
(4) “[F]acts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to
have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.”228
Given the centrality of the legislature in statutory interpretation and
the “faithful agent” nature of the relationship between the Court and
Congress in statutory cases,229 I would add to this list of factors the
countervailing consideration of whether Congress has expressly
approved the implementation test at issue. That is, if Congress has
affirmed a Court-adopted implementation test in the course of amending
the statute—including by favorably mentioning the test in the legislative
227

505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992).
Id. at 854–55; see also Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173–74 (1989)
(delineating similar criteria); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 412 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)) (same).
229
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv. L.
Rev. 405, 415 (1989) (“According to the most prominent conception of the role of courts in
statutory construction, judges are agents or servants of the legislature. . . . The judicial task is
to discern and apply a judgment made by others, most notably the legislature.”); Nicholas S.
Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model
of Statutory Interpretation, 76 Va. L. Rev. 1295, 1313 (1990) (“Traditional democratic
theory suggests that the court interpreting a statute must act as the faithful agent of the
legislature’s intent.”).
228
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record accompanying the amendment—then that legislative affirmation
should preclude judicial overruling of the test.230 In statutory
interpretation, unlike in common-law rulemaking and constitutional
interpretation, Congress is sovereign and therefore should be given
priority over courts in establishing statutory meaning. Thus, even if a
particular implementation test has proved to be problematic, confusing,
or unworkable in practice, it should be upheld if expressly approved by
Congress. If Congress (the principal) says a particular interpretation of a
statute is good, then the Court (the agent) must accept that.
It is one thing, of course, to note all of this theoretically, but what
would application of this ordinary form of stare decisis, supplemented
by a congressional-approval caveat, look like in practice? The next
section considers how this proposed rule would have played out in the
cases discussed in Part I.
1. Evolving Economic Theory Cases. On the one hand, none of the
implementation tests involved in the economic-theory cases in Part I
were unworkable or difficult to administer. Indeed, the precedent tests
were easier to implement than the tests the textualist Justices sought to
replace them with.231 Reliance interests, to the extent they existed, also
favored upholding the precedent implementation tests.232 The crucial
consideration in both Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment and Leegin
Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc. thus was the fourth Casey
factor (facts have changed) and, to some extent, the third (related
principles of law have changed). Indeed, in all of the evolvingeconomic-theory cases listed in Appendix I, the textualist-leaning
Justices’ push to overrule was based on an argument that the economic
theory (i.e., the facts) underlying the interpretation at issue had changed
so significantly as to rob the precedent of significant application or

230
Recent scholarship has noted the prevalence of this type of “legislative underwrite,”
through which Congress expressly endorses the Court’s interpretation of a statute. See Ethan
J. Leib & James J. Brudney, Legislative Underwrites, 103 Va. L. Rev. 101 (2017).
231
See Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 924 (2007) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (making this point); Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2408–09
(2015) (citing Brief for Petitioner) (same); supra notes 141–143 and accompanying text.
232
See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 925 (cataloguing “considerable reliance upon the per se rule”).
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justification.233 In Kimble, there seemed to be little disagreement
between the Justices on this point; all of the Justices seemed to concede
that the rule established in Brulotte v. Thys Co234 was outmoded.235
Under the ordinary form of stare decisis applicable to common-law
precedents, then, the Brulotte rule might have been an acceptable
candidate for overruling.
In Leegin, by contrast, the question whether the economic theory had
changed significantly was fiercely debated. While the textualist and
textualist-leaning Justices argued that new studies by economists had
disproved the theories on which the precedent interpretations were
based, the purposivist-leaning Justices insisted that the discrediting
economic studies were not new, but merely repeated critiques that had
been raised and rejected when the precedents were decided.236 The
Justices who voted to overrule in Leegin also argued that subsequent
legal developments—including rulings by the Supreme Court in related
cases—had eroded the rule adopted in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D.
Park & Sons Co.237 (Casey’s third factor).238 The purposivist Justices
who voted to affirm Dr. Miles disagreed with this characterization.239
They also hinted at congressional approval, noting that Congress had
considered and rejected the economic arguments raised by the overrulers
in legislative hearings.240 (The purposivist Justices did not, however,
point to any evidence of express congressional approval of the Dr. Miles
precedent). Given this contention over the extent to which the relevant

233
See Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2415–16 (Alito, J., dissenting); Halliburton Co. v. Erica P.
John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2420–21 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment);
Leegin, 551 U.S. at 889–92; State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 15–19 (1997).
234
See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
235
See Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2412 (noting a “broad scholarly consensus” supports
Kimble’s position).
236
See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 920–23 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting). A similar debate
between the textualist and purposivist Justices took place in another economic theory case.
See Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2410.
237
See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
238
See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 887. Cf. Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2418, 2423 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (similarly arguing that subsequent legal developments lend
support of overruling precedent).
239
See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 920–21 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
240
See id. at 908 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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factual and legal circumstances changed, Leegin likely would have been
a close case even under a relaxed form of stare decisis.
2. Statutes In Pari Materia. A rule applying ordinary stare decisis for
implementation test precedents would not, as a general matter, support
textualist Justices’ relaxed approach to precedents for related statutes
that are in pari materia with the statute at issue in the precedent case.
That is, the traditional rule would not allow members of a later Court to
refuse to apply an implementation-test precedent to a closely related
statute simply because the members of the later Court believe the initial
construction of the first statute to be incorrect. In my view, this rule
makes sense because when two statutes have a history of being
interpreted in the same manner—such that constructions given to one
also govern the other—allowing the Court to reject an implementation
test applicable to one statute when construing the other results in
overwhelming confusion about which related precedents apply to both
statutes and which do not. In the Title VII and ADEA context, for
example, the law now stands in a perplexing in-between position: Title
VII precedents sometimes apply to ADEA interpretation questions, but
other times do not.241 Moreover, this kind of related-statutes exception is
really just a way of allowing a later Court to erode a statutory precedent
with which it disagrees—by limiting its application. In this sense, the
related-statute exception is merely another version of the “just plain
wrong!” argument.
On the other hand, if an implementation test precedent that ordinarily
would apply to a related statute has proved unworkable, then the Court
would not be bound to apply that precedent to the related statute. Thus,
in CBOCS West Inc. v. Humphries, the dissenting opinion’s argument
that the retaliation claim recognized for Section 1982 should not be
applied to Section 1981 would not have succeeded, because there was no
indication that the rules established in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park or
Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ. were unworkable to administer or
241
This confusion is not entirely the fault of Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167
(2009). Earlier cases had muddled the waters before Gross—holding, for example, that
procedural questions about the ADEA should be governed by Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”) precedents rather than Title VII precedents because the ADEA’s remedial
provisions were modeled on the FLSA. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580–85 (1978).
But Gross has added significantly to the confusion and lack of predictability.
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that subsequent legal or factual developments had rendered those
precedents obsolete. Gross v. FBL Financial Services would be a closer
case under the proposed ordinary stare decisis rule because the majority
opinion did argue that the “motivating factor” test had proved
unworkable in the lower courts.242 However, this argument was
countered by the fact that Congress expressly endorsed the “motivating
factor” framework in its 1991 amendments to Title VII.243 Under the
congressional-approval caveat advocated in this Article, that express
legislative endorsement would trump any workability objections to the
Court’s implementation test.
3. Unworkable Implementation Tests. As suggested by Casey factor
four, implementation tests that the Court believes to be unworkable
should be ideal candidates for overruling. In order to guard against abuse
of this factor, courts should ensure that there is sufficient evidence of
lower court confusion or other difficulty administering an
implementation test before overruling it. Of the cases discussed in Part
I.C, Altria Group v. Good seems to be the strongest candidate for
overruling. This is because there does seem to have been objective
evidence of lower-court confusion and difficulty implementing the
predicate-duty test established in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, and there
does not appear to have been any evidence that Congress endorsed that
test.244 By contrast, as discussed above, ordinary stare decisis likely
would not have supported the Court’s refusal in Gross to apply Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins’s burden-shifting implementation test to the
ADEA—since Congress had expressly approved that test in the 1991
CRA.245 Last, it also seems unlikely that Holder v. Hall would have
presented a good opportunity for overruling, even under ordinary stare
decisis. There does not seem to have been any objective evidence that
the vote-dilution test adopted in Thornburg v. Gingles and criticized by
Justice Thomas in Holder had proved unworkable in practice. Rather,
242

Gross, 557 U.S. at 178-79.
See id. at 185–87 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Because Congress has codified a mixedmotives framework for Title VII cases—the vast majority of antidiscrimination lawsuits—
the Court’s concerns about that framework are of no moment.”).
244
See Altria Grp. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 97 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing
confusion in lower federal court cases).
245
See Gross, 557 U.S. at 185–87 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
243
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Justice Thomas’s objection to the Gingles test seems to have been based
on a view that it invited too much judicial policymaking—an objection
based on his jurisprudential philosophy, rather than concrete evidence
regarding lower courts’ experiences implementing the test.246
4. Inaccurate Precedents. Notably, an administrability-based
exception to statutory stare decisis would not allow for overruling based
on the Court’s conviction that a previous interpretation was “just plain
wrong!” This is because a “just plain wrong!” standard is open-ended
and allows judges to overturn precedents based on simple disagreement
with the original interpretation—something that is frowned upon even
under ordinary stare decisis. Indeed, a “just plain wrong!” standard
would effectively leave every precedent open to revision and, in the
process, upend the very concept of statutory stare decisis. As scholars
have noted:
[I]f a court under a purported regime of stare decisis is
free to disregard any previous decisions it believes
wrong, then the standard for disregarding is the same
when stare decisis applies as when it does not, and the
alleged stare decisis norm turns out to be doing no
work.247
In other words, stare decisis comes into effect only when the Court
believes a previous case was incorrectly decided—if the precedent were
correct on the merits, the Court would uphold it for that reason, without
regard to stare decisis.248
5. Overrides. Finally, a rule applying the ordinary form of stare
decisis to statutory precedents that create implementation tests would
not support textualist Justices’ narrow approach to congressional
overrides in certain recent cases. When Congress does pay attention to
246

Holder, 512 U.S. at 892–93 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
Frederick Schauer, Has Precedent Ever Really Mattered in the Supreme Court?, 24 Ga.
St. U.L. Rev. 381, 389–90 (2007).
248
See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on
Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 570, 570 (2001); Jill E. Fisch, The
Implications of Transition Theory for Stare Decisis, 13 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 93, 97
(2003) (noting that stare decisis does no work where the later court agrees on the merits);
Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 411, 417 (2010)
(“…[T]he Court needs to talk about stare decisis only where it suspects or concludes that a
precedent is wrong.”).
247
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an implementation test and goes to the trouble of overriding the Court’s
formulation, the Court should yield and give full effect to the override.
This is a corollary to the congressional-approval caveat described above;
Congress is the master in matters of statutory interpretation, so when it
expressly addresses the validity of a statutory precedent, its will should
be given effect. Moreover, the agency analogue discussed earlier
suggests that when Congress expressly disapproves of the Court’s
adoption of a particular implementation test, the Court, like
administrative agencies, should follow Congress’s expressed preference
rather than seek to curtail it. Of course, the Court is not an
administrative agency; it has a distinct and unique role to play in
monitoring lower courts and the judicial system as well as a checks-andbalances function that agencies do not possess. But these roles and
functions do not justify holding Congress to what is effectively a clearstatement standard, the way the Court has done in the cases discussed in
Section II.B.
Further, while it makes sense for the Court, given its monitor role, to
update an implementation test when it becomes aware of workability
problems that Congress is not aware of, it does not make sense for the
Court to stubbornly adhere to its own initial interpretation when
Congress has paid attention to an implementation test and has repudiated
it. In other words, the Court’s views about the merits of its own test may
trump when Congress has not spoken, but they should not trump when
Congress has spoken. Notably, in override cases like Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber, the Court seems deliberately to be limiting the
reach of a congressional override—which seems problematic both from
a faithful-agency and from a separation-of-powers perspective. After all,
how is Congress supposed to provide a legislative check if the Court
reads Congress’s corrections narrowly, privileging the prior judicial
interpretation whenever possible?
CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to illuminate an important and little-noticed
trend in statutory interpretation jurisprudence—textualist Justices’
willingness to abandon statutory stare decisis in certain cases—and to
glean important insights and lessons about textualism and statutory
interpretation theory from that trend. In particular, it has demonstrated
that textualists and their cohorts seem to view statutory precedents that
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create an implementation test as different, and less worthy of deference
by subsequent courts, than precedents that engage in ordinary “X term
means Y” analysis. Further, it has argued that textualists’ attitude
towards implementation tests highlights under-appreciated differences
between textualists and purposivists, such as the greater weight that
textualists give to the Supreme Court’s monitoring function over lower
courts. This Article also has suggested that the implementation-test
caveat may help explain textualist Justices’ reluctance to give full effect
to some congressional overrides. Normatively, it has agreed with the
textualist Justices that statutory stare decisis should be relaxed for
precedents that establish implementation tests, with the caveat that the
Court should not overrule an implementation test if Congress has
expressly approved that test through statements in the legislative record,
in an amendment, or subsequent law. At the same time, it has criticized
some textualist Justices’ willingness to overrule statutory precedents
with which they simply disagree—and has defended statutory stare
decisis in such cases.
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Appendix I
Statutory Stare Decisis Cases
Rehnquist-Roberts Courts
(Non-Exhaustive List)

Case Name

Opinion
Advocating
Overruling

Author

Reason for
Overruling

Kimble v. Marvel
Entm’t, 135 S. Ct.
2401 (2015) (Patent
Act)

Dissent

Alito (Thomas,
Roberts)

Evolving Economic
Theory, Judicial
Policymaking
(involves
implementation test)

Perez v. Mortgage
Bankers Ass’n, 135 S.
Ct. 1199 (2015)
(Administrative
Procedure Act)

Concurrence

Alito

Willingness to consider
overruling in future
case

Concurrence

Scalia

Text

Concurrence

Thomas

Text

Thomas

Text, Related Statute
(involves
implementation test)

Alito (Roberts,
Scalia,
Thomas)

Text, Related Statute
(involves
implementation test)

Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Dissent
Cmty. Affairs v.
Inclusive Cmtys.
Project, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2507
(2015) (Fair Housing
Act)
Dissent
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Halliburton Co. v.
Erica P. John Fund,
Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 2398
(2014) (Securities
Act)

Concurrence

Thomas
(Scalia, Alito)

Evolving Economic
Theory, Judicial
Policymaking
(involves
implementation test)

Mich. v. Bay Mills
Indian Cmty., 134 S.
Ct. 2024 (2014)
(Indian Gaming Reg.
Act)

Dissent

Thomas
(Scalia,
Ginsburg,
Alito)

Judicial
Policymaking,
Subsequent legal
developments

Gross v. FBL Fin.
Servs.,
557 U.S. 167 (2009)

Majority

Thomas
(Roberts,
Scalia,
Kennedy,
Alito)

Text, Related Statute,
Unworkable
(involves
implementation test)

Altria Grp. v. Good,
555 U.S. 70 (2008)
(Tobacco Statute)

Dissent

Thomas
(Roberts,
Scalia, Alito)

Unworkable, Text,
Judicial
Policymaking
(involves
implementation test)

CBOCS West, Inc. v.
Humphries,
553 U.S. 442 (2008)
(Section 1981)

Dissent

Thomas
(Scalia)

Text, Related Statute

Gonzalez v. United
States, 553 U.S. 242
(2008) (Federal
Magistrate Act)

Dissent

Thomas

Text, Unworkable,
Inconsistent w/
Previous Cases

(Age Discrimination
in Employment Act)
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John R. Sand &
Gravel v. United
States, 552 U.S. 130
(2008) (Tucker Act)

Dissent

Ginsburg

Subsequent Legal
Development,
Unworkable
(involves
implementation test)

Preston v. Ferrer,
552 U.S. 346 (2008)
(Federal Arbitration
Act)

Dissent

Thomas

Text

Kimbrough v. United
States,
552 U.S. 85 (2007)
(Sentencing Statute)

Dissent

Thomas

Text, Judicial
Policymaking
(involves
implementation test)

Leegin Creative
Leather Prods. v.
PSKS, Inc.,
551 U.S. 877 (2007)
(Sherman Act)

Majority

Kennedy
(Roberts,
Scalia, Alito,
Thomas)

Evolving Economic
Theory + Common
Law Statute,
Subsequent Legal
Developments,
Judicial
Policymaking
(involves
implementation test)

Clark v. Martinez,
543 U.S. 371 (2005)
(Immigration Law)

Dissent

Thomas
(Rehnquist)

Text, Issue Almost
Constitutional

BedRoc Ltd. v.
Concurrence
United States, 541
U.S. 176 (2004)
(Pittman Underground
Water Act)

Thomas
(Breyer)

Text, Related Statute

Hohn v. United

Stevens

Text, Subsequent

Majority
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States,
524 U.S. 236 (1995)
(Criminal Statute)

229

(Ginsburg,
Breyer)

Legal Developments

Holder v. Hall, 512
U.S. 874 (1994)
(Voting Rights Act)

Concurrence

Thomas
(Scalia)

Text, Judicial
Policymaking,
Unworkable
(involves
implementation test)

Hilton v. S.C. Pub.
Rys,
502 U.S. 197 (1991)
(Federal Employers
Liability Act)

Dissent

O’Connor
(Scalia)

Messy, Unworkable

Irwin v. Dep’t of
Veterans Affairs,
498 U.S. 89 (1990)
(Title VII)

Majority

Rehnquist
(Scalia,
Blackmun,
O’Connor,
Kennedy)

Unpredictable, AdHoc

Gulfstream Aerospace
Corp. v. Mayacamas,
485 U.S. 271 (1988)
(Jurisdictional
Statute)

Majority

Marshall
(Unan.)

Outmoded,
Unworkable
(involves
implementation test)

Johnson v. Transp.
Agency Santa Clara
Cty.,
480 U.S. 616 (1987)
(Title VII)

Dissent

Scalia
(Rehnquist)

Text, Judicial
Policymaking,
Precedent was the
Anomaly, No
Reliance, Subsequent
Cases
(involves
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implementation test)

Square D Co. v.
Niagara Frontier
Tariff Bureau, Inc.,
476 U.S 409 (1986)
(Sherman Act)

Dissent

Marshall

Subsequent Legal
Developments

City of Oklahoma
City v. Tuttle,
471 U.S. 808 (1985)
(Section 1983)

Dissent

Stevens

Judicial
Policymaking (calls it
dicta/judicial
legislating)
(involves
implementation test)

Miller v. Fenton,
474 U.S. 104 (1985)
(Habeas Corpus
Statute)

Dissent

Rehnquist

Federal v. State Cases
(distinguishing)
(involves
implementation test)

Monell v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs. Of New
York, 436 U.S. 658
(1978) (Section 1983)

Majority

Brennan
(Powell,
Stevens,
Marshall,
Stewart, White,
Blackmun)

Precedent Itself
Departed from Other
Caselaw

Cont’l T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
433 U.S. 36 (1977)
(Sherman Act)

Majority

Powell
(Burger,
Stewart,
Blackmun,
Stevens)

Economic Theory
(involves
implementation test)

Lodge 76, Int’l Assoc.
of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers v.

Majority

Brennan
(Burger,
Blackmun,

Subsequent Legal
Developments
(involves
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Wisc. Emp’t
Relations Comm’n,
427 U.S. 132 (1976)
(National Labor
Relations Act)

Flood v. Kuhn, 407
U.S. 258 (1972)
(Sherman Act)

Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, Inc.,
398 U.S. 375 (1970)
(Death on the High
Seas Act, Jones Act)
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Powell,
Marshall,
White)

implementation test)

Dissent

Douglas
(Brennan)

Subsequent Legal
Developments,
Equities

Dissent

Marshall
(Brennan)

Majority

Harlan (Unan.)

Unworkable
(involves
implementation test)

